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Abstract 
This document reviews a spectrum of potential of alternative service delivery project 
models that might be advantageous for Teck’s Active Water Treatment Facilities by achieving 
capital and operating cost reductions, and allowing Teck to focus on core mining activities. 
Screening criteria are provided to assess if these models should be considered as part of a 
framework to guide decision-making. In principle, the attributes of these water treatment facilities 
support alternative service delivery, but would require verification of potential economic benefits. 
It would also need a shift from Teck’s traditional project delivery culture that likely cannot be 
achieved in a timely manner for the facility at Fording River Operations, which is now in the 
engineering study phase. However, a comparative analysis of different models for this facility 
would define whether further consideration of alternative service delivery is warranted for 
subsequent facilities. 
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1 Introduction 
Open pit mining activities to produce coal generate large volumes of waste rock, from 
which release of selenium, nitrate, and other constituents into watersheds is a growing industry 
problem. At Teck Coal, selenium and nitrate concentrations in surface waters are above 
conservative provincial guidelines at monitoring locations in the Elk River watershed, and are 
increasing in many areas, although currently at levels not yet significantly affecting aquatic 
health. Teck’s Area-Based Management Plan, approved by the Minister [ABMP, 2014], commits 
to installing active water treatment facilities (AWTFs) at strategic capacities and locations over a 
number of years as a key component of a broader inventory of activities to stop the increase in 
selenium and nitrate loading in the watershed, and then to reduce the levels towards historical 
background values. Since operating wastewater treatment facilities is a cost centre, the high-level 
strategy for Teck is simple: deliver reliable performance at minimum net present cost. 
Teck’s traditional approach to project delivery involves contracting an engineering 
service provider to design and manage construction of a facility with close oversight by Teck, and 
then to operate the facility with in-house resources. Currently, Teck Coal’s Water Projects and 
Operations (WPO) business unit does not have the in-house resources or expertise necessary to 
operate these AWTFs and will thus contract out basic services for the first AWTF at West Line 
Creek (WLC) for a short-term period (6-12 months) through plant commissioning. During this 
period, Teck will evaluate the service provider’s performance for a three-year-term operations 
and maintenance contract, including full staffing of the water treatment plant up to the site 
manager. The alternative model would be for Teck to transition WLC AWTF operations and 
maintenance to Teck-only operating personnel, but this would require staff recruiting and training 
not currently planned beyond that to provide management oversight. 
A pre-feasibility study for the second AWTF at Fording River Operations (FRO) started 
in May 2015. The project is on a very tight schedule to be operating before the end of 2018. A 
decision to outsource, or not, operations and maintenance of this AWTF has not been made. 
Project execution is currently following a traditional engineering-procurement-construction-
management (EPCM) model with technology selection led by Teck, an engineering services 
contractor designing and managing construction of the AWTF facility, and with expected 
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handover to Teck for operations and maintenance after completion of construction and water 
commissioning. 
There are precedents for outsourcing wastewater-treatment facility design, construction, 
operations, maintenance, and even ownership or financing. Motivations are so that the owner can 
focus on core businesses and, because the service provider can bring focus, discipline, and 
expertise, lower life cycle costs by attributing some risks to the provider. A spectrum of potential 
of outsourcing or alternative service delivery (ASD) business models exist that might achieve 
capital and operating cost reductions. ASD is a term used by EPCOR [Sonnenberg, 2015] and is 
appropriate to cover a range of project or service delivery models for both public-private 
partnerships (P3) and private-private partnerships. At one end is full outsourcing whereby the 
service provider designs, constructs, owns, operations, and maintains the facility. At the other end 
is the current trajectory for FRO following Teck’s traditional approach to project outlined above. 
This project reviews potential ASD business model options that might be advantageous 
for Teck’s AWTFs and offers screening criteria to assess whether these models should be 
considered as part of a framework to guide a decision analysis. The criteria and framework draw 
largely from PPP Canada, a Crown Corporation established to guide municipalities in assessing 
public-private partnerships for infrastructure projects, but also from literature learnings and 
interviews with selected potential ASD providers. This document consists of the following 
sections: 
2 Wastewater Treatment Industry Analysis – This section overviews the wastewater treatment 
industry and establishes that competition to operate wastewater treatment plants is a favourable 
opportunity for Teck. 
3 Learnings from the Literature – This section outlines the pros and cons of potential project 
delivery models, presents an ASD screening assessment criteria, outlines a framework to guide a 
decision analysis, and provides interview results with selected potential ASD providers. 
4 Case Studies – This section highlights the methodology and outcomes of an evaluation by 
Deloitte to assess P3 potential for the City or Regina and the financial summary by a peer review 
team to assess P3 potential for the Capital Regional District, in the City of Victoria. 
5 Teck Perspectives and ASD Assessment for AWTF – This section makes a preliminary 
screening assessment for ASD of Teck’ AWTFs and identifies challenges for Teck to consider 
this procurement method. 
  3 
6 Conclusions and Recommendations – This section wraps up the report with key conclusions 
and offers recommendations to evaluate ASD further. 
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2 Wastewater Treatment Industry Analysis 
This document defines industrial wastewater treatment of mining-impacted water as an 
“industry” and focusses on Teck Coal specifically. The products are, effectively, reputational 
image and license to operate the mines and coal preparation plants, but of course treated water is 
also physically produced, along with some byproducts. The customers are governments and a 
range of stakeholders. Competitors may be defined broadly as competing coal companies that 
must also comply with water quality standards in their respective jurisdictions, but more 
specifically in this document, competitors are the technology vendors, contractors, and operators 
that provide both the wastewater treatment technologies and services to operate them. The 
industry geographical basis is global, from the perspective of both the coal and the wastewater 
treatment industries: Teck, the vendors, and contractors compete globally. Teck operates in both 
industries, one serving as the license to operate in the other. 
2.1 Wastewater Treatment Strategy 
The strip ratio to produce coal at Teck, the ratio of waste rock moved out of the way to 
access the desirable coal-rich material, is about 12:1. As a result, there are now very large and 
growing piles of waste rock at each of the mines. This material contains small amounts of pyrite 
and other selenium-containing minerals, as well as residual nitrates from the blasting emulsions. 
These waste piles are not sealed to prevent water and air ingress. Over time, water and air flow 
through the waste piles mobilizes the selenium and nitrate into adjacent creeks, leading to 
elevated concentrations in the Fording and Elk Rivers. 
Teck’s Elk Valley Water Quality Plan (EVWQP), developed with input from the public, 
First Nations, governments, technical experts, and other stakeholders, commits to installing and 
operating active1 water treatment facilities (AWTFs) at selected mine sites to treat creek waters 
before they enter the Fording and Elk Rivers until covers are possibly proven to prevent water 
and air infiltration into the waste piles and thus stop neutral rock drainage from occurring. Start-
up of the first plant was initiated in late 2014, but was shut down shortly after start-up to make 
modifications, still underway, after an environmental incident. A second plant at a different 
location is planned to be operating before the end of 2018, with pre-feasibility engineering now 
underway. 
                                                     
1 The term active means operated like a production process as distinct from a passive water treatment 
system. 
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Figure 2.1 shows an understanding of Teck’s target position at the green dot on a 
conceptual performance (productivity) frontier. Somewhat better than minimum acceptable 
performance (dictated by permits) is desired to ensure compliance is maintained though inevitable 
and natural variations in operation. Minimizing costs is paramount for an operation that, apart 
from the opportunity to build reputation, is simply a cost centre. The high-level strategy for 
Teck’s active wastewater treatment is simple: deliver reliable performance at minimum net 
present cost (NPC), but importantly, also to adapt to changing needs of the watershed as they 
become evident. 
Expanding the performance frontier, with say new technology or ASD, opens two 
opportunities: reduce NPC or increase reputational image by achieving better performance by 
reaching concentrations for selenium and nitrate concentrations below permit requirements. The 
shape of the curves is intentional to suggest that for a given effort and shift in the frontier, there 
might be more to be gained in cost reduction at a given suite of target conditions than gained in 
reputational image by reaching ever-lower effluent targets. 
 
Figure 2.1 Performance frontier modelled after Porter’s productivity frontier [Porter, 1996]. 
 
The volume of mining-impacted wastewater to treat at Teck is relatively small compared 
to other wastewater treatment applications across a range of industries and municipalities. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2.2 for selected Effluent Treatment Plants (ETPs) and the first three AWTFs 
at Teck versus total sewage treatment for Greater Vancouver in five wastewater plants and the 
upgraded and expanded wastewater treatment plant now under construction for the City of Regina 
using an ASD model. All plants except the ETP utilize biological processes. Worth noting is that 
technologies cannot necessarily be transferred directly across applications, or even from Teck’s 
ETP applications to the AWTFs. 
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Figure 2.2 Relative size of selected water treatment facilities at Teck versus Greater 
Vancouver [GVRSDD, 2009] and City of Regina [Deloitte, 2013] sewage treatment plants. 
 
Figure 2.3 takes a Porter’s five forces [Porter, 2008] approach augmented by the 
Government factor [McGinn, 2010] to defining the wastewater treatment industry. Bubble size 
represents estimated influence. Green represents a potentially favourable force and red is 
undesirable with respect to Teck Coal. Clearly, there are more and larger red influencers than 
green, meaning wastewater treatment is not a desirable industry to be in from a coal producing 
perspective, but exiting is virtually impossible. Producing coal now means cleaning up impacted 
water. 
Customers - The main product from an AWTF is, of course, treated water, but it is of 
negligible monetary value. The effective products are reputational image and license to operate as 
judged by governments, NGOs, and other stakeholders, who, in effect, are the “customers”. They 
have considerable influence on the AWTF operator in a way that generally increases costs, 
although working openly with the stakeholder groups has allowed Teck to develop AWTF end-
of-pipe targets in the EVWQP that are protective of aquatic life in the watershed. 
Substitutes - Covers and diversions are substitutes to avoid having to treat the water, or 
as much of it, in the first place. These would be favourable outcomes. 
Greater Vancouver
Sewage Treatment: 1.2 Mm3/d
In five treatment plants
Teck Coal
3 x AWTF: 57,500 m3/d
Teck Trail Smelter
ETP: 15,000 m3/d
Teck Kimberly
ETP: 30,000 m3/d peak
Teck Red Dog
ETP: 37,000 m3/d
82,000 m3/d peak
Mines
City of Regina
Sewage Treatment: 92,000 m3/d
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Figure 2.3 Porter’s Five Forces [Porter, 2008] with the Government Factor [McGinn, 2010] 
 
Suppliers - Upstream mining operations create the wastewater in the first place. The 
mines have high influence because in the near-term, until methods can be developed to mitigate 
mobilization of selenium and nitrate (which, by the way, are being vigorously investigated by 
Teck) and once it has been prescribed and promised that the wastewater will be treated, the 
supply cannot be turned off. Labour accounts for only about 15% of operating costs, but these 
facilities will operate 24/7 to maintain treated water flow. As well, shutting down and restarting 
biological processes is not an ideal situation. Therefore, there is some sensitivity with respect to 
possible labour flexibility. Also, in terms of process engineering for new AWTFs, there seem to 
limited companies with good process engineering experience. For these reasons, the bubble is 
(mostly) red. 
The leading technologies for selenium and nitrate removal are currently biological. Based 
on scoping-level estimates, reagents and chemicals, including specialty and proprietary reagents 
for the biological systems in the AWTFs, make up about 50% of the overall operating costs, so 
there is certainly sensitivity to escalation in reagent prices. However, price hold-up is unlikely 
because most are commodities and even the proprietary and specialty reagents can be substituted; 
therefore, reagent supplier power is low. Again, in terms of constructing new AWTFs, other than 
processing engineering capability, there are many companies that can provide Engineering, 
Procurement, and Construction Management (EPCM) services. For these reasons, the bubble has 
a hint of green. 
Rivalry
Regulators
Customers
New Entrants
Substitutes
Suppliers
New technology providers and 
vendors have potential to reduce 
capital and operating costs 
Governments are key watchdogs 
representing all stakeholders;
NGOs have considerable clout to dictate 
and influence “product” performance;
Municipalities and other stakeholders 
can exert gentle pressure
Many companies can design, build and 
operate wastewater treatment facilities 
potentially provides choices to outsource
Regulators, under pressure from 
NGOs and public, prescribe product 
performance guidelines 
Mining operations generate the water to be treated, 
which can’t be turned off, at least in near term;
Utility providers can’t be switched;
Reagents are effectively commodities
Diversions and covers are possible substitutes to 
treating water and successful implementation 
(even partial) would also build reputation
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Regulators – Government regulators set the compliance targets (product quality) that 
must be met (although Teck has leeway on end-of-pipe targets as mentioned above) and have the 
power to impose fines and other penalties for inadequate performance. 
New entrants – This group represents mainly new technologies, vendors, and potential 
outsourcing contractors (described next), all of which represent favourable opportunities to 
reduce capital and operating costs. 
Rivalry – This project focusses on this issue. A representative listing of the many 
precedents for outsourcing wastewater treatment is presented in Table 2.1. In fact, the more 
rivalry amongst potential technology and ASD providers, the better. Other contractors not 
included in Table 2.1 include Severn Trent Costain, United Water (operations group of French 
company Suez), Evoqua (formally Siemens), Woodard and Curran, and California Water 
[Chwirka, 2015]. 
There are important nuances worth noting amongst the potential outsourcing providers. 
First, experience may not be fully transferable. For example, EPCOR started as Edmonton’s 
power and utility company and evolved its water business through infrastructure project 
execution capability [EPCOR, 2015] and now consider themselves class-leading operators 
[Cudrac, 2015]. They have experience with biological systems, which is also a technology 
deployed in the first two AWTFs, but that experience is all for municipal systems that do not treat 
for selenium. 
Next, some are also technology providers; for example, BioteQ Environmental 
Technologies Inc., Envirogen Technologies, Inc., GE Power and Water, and Veolia Water 
Solutions and Technology Canada all offer proprietary technologies. Yet, development of their 
technologies was not necessarily initiated in-house, but rather by purchase of others to grow their 
technology platforms, or by licensing other technologies. As examples, Applied Biosciences, 
which initiated development of ABMet®, was bought by Zenon Environmental, which was then 
bought by GE. Further, the two co-developers from Applied Biosciences are no longer with GE, 
but are now leading competing companies, Inotec, Inc. and Frontier Water Systems, to develop 
new technologies that each believes will improve on their origional collaboration. Veolia is a 
licensee of the Anox Kaldness systems. An early version of Envirogen’s Fluidized Bed Reactor 
(FBR) technology was initiated at Dorr Oliver before being commercialized by Envirogen with 
input from a key individual on contract who had previously worked for Dorr Oliver [Enegess, 
2015]. 
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Table 2.1 Representative wastewater and groundwater treatment outsourcing examples. 
Company Clients/Application Contracting Models 
EPCOR [2015] Municipalities in Alberta and British 
Columbia (water distribution and 
wastewater treatment) 
Oil sands operations (water distribution 
and wastewater treatment for operating 
camps) 
Operate/Maintain 
Own Operate/Maintain 
Build-Own-Operate/Maintain 
Design-Build-Operate/Maintain 
Design-Build-Finance-Operate/Maintain 
(contracts from 10 y to in-perpetuity) 
 Britannia Mine (metals removal by lime, 
and storage of lime/sludge mix) 
Operate/Maintain (20-y guaranteed 
performance contract with Province of 
British Columbia for mine and water 
treatment facilities) 
 Municipalities in USA (water and 
wastewater treatment/distribution) 
Own-Operate (contracts in-perpetuity) 
Veolia 
[Oliphant, 2014, 
2015] 
Consol – (six coal mines in West 
Virginia - mine wastewater treatment by 
chemical precipitation, reverse osmosis) 
UK Coal Authority – (closed Wheal 
Jane Tin mine - wastewater treatment) 
Design-Build-Operate/Maintain (10-y 
contract) 
 
Operate/Maintain (10-y contract to 
2020) 
 Coal mine in US (new NO3 and Se 
AWTF) 
Molycorp (wastewater treatment) 
Operate/Maintain 
Design-Build-Operate 
Water [2004, 
2005, 2006] 
Municipalities in China, Germany, 
Czech Republic (wastewater treatment) 
Design-Build-Operate 
Operate/Maintain 
Build-Operate/Maintain (20-30-y 
contracts) 
CH2M Patriot Coal (NO3 and Se AWTF) 
Hanford (NO3, chromates) 
Design-Build-Operate 
GE [Behr, 2015] Bradwell-on-Sea, UK (influent water 
treatment) 
Conoco Humber Refinery, UK (influent 
water treatment) 
Capital and Service Contract 
 
Own-Operate/Maintain 
Envirogen 
[Enegess, 2015] 
Groundwater AWTF using FBRs at 
Tronox superfund site for Nevada 
Environmental Response Trust; 
Industrial wastewater at Aerojet and 
Nammo Talley; plus others 
Operate/Maintain 
 Superfund sites AWTF at Ventron–
Velsicol, Blosenski Landfill 
Design-Build-Operate 
BioteQ [2013] Raglan Mine (water treatment plant – 
nickel mine), Quebec 
Build-Own-Operate 
 Dexing Project, China (acid mine 
drainage) 
Design-Operate as joint venture 
 Bisbee Project, Arizona (wastewater 
treatment 2004-2013) 
50/50 joint venture with Freeport-
McMoRan 
 Mount Gordon, Australia (water 
treatment plant)  
Build-Own-Operate 
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Furthermore, strategic direction can change. For example, CH2M HILL (now CH2M) 
restructured to merge their municipal and industrial water divisions, and there have been 
resignations by several key industrial water treatment experts [Sandy, 2014]. In summary, 
knowing the origin of the technology and if the individuals that developed it are still around or if 
their protégés have “learned the trade” and following the migration of expertise are important. 
Technology providers may overstate their current technology development status, which ART 
learned in a pilot program with one vendor. Some amount of owner due diligence cannot be 
avoided. 
Finally, leadership change may result in different compensation philosophies. For 
example, BioteQ now seeks a royalty and/or partial to use their technology (once they advance it 
sufficiently) rather than a one-time licensing fee. 
2.2 Teck Strategy Areas and Opportunities 
Figure 2.4 remaps the New Entrants and Rivalry forces into several strategy areas to 
reduce NPC, balanced by several largely internal (The British Columbia Mines Act is an 
exception) key constraint areas. The distance from the fulcrum estimates the relative potential or 
actual influence of the strategy and constraint areas to influence NPC. The colours (green is most, 
red is least, orange is in between) indicate the relative extent to which the given strategy has been 
or is being explored at Teck as explained below. Teck’s investigation of the three strategy areas 
under Rivalry are constrained by a well-defined project development stage-gating process and 
traditional EPCM delivery model. The balance of this MBA project explores ASD models as 
opportunities to reduce life-cycle project costs. 
 
Figure 2.4 Balancing strategy areas versus constraint area. 
 
Technology
Operating
CostFinancing
Capital 
Execution Timelines
Reputational 
Risk
Cultural 
Change
Strategy Areas Representative Constraint Areas
RivalryNew 
Entrants
Net Present Cost
Cash 
Rationing
Mines Act,
Collective 
Agreements
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Technology – Following pilot programs in 2011, 2013, and 2014, work is continuing in 
2015 with another pilot program directed by Teck to address concern areas remaining from the 
previous pilot programs in order to verify a technology this October for the next AWTF at FRO. 
In parallel, scanning and evaluation of a spectrum of other potential technologies continues from 
previous years’ effort with a view to subsequent AWTFs. 
Financing – Teck’s current strategy has been to own and operate wastewater treatment 
facilities, or “in-sourcing”. There are outsourcing precedents in wastewater treatment to design-
build-own-operate (DBOO) that Teck has not explored. 
Capital Execution – Teck’s strategy has generally been traditional EPCM contracts 
based on Teck design guidelines. The civil works and building in the first AWTF were expensive. 
These items, which are somewhat independent of technology, are being examined by value 
engineering as part of the current pre-feasibility study for the FRO AWTF. Alternative delivery 
models have not been explored in depth yet may identify potential paradigm-shifting cost 
reduction opportunities, especially related to risk attribution to a contracting consortium. 
Operating Cost – Technology selection largely defines reagent and utility inputs, and 
thus associated operating costs. ASD have not been explored in depth that might identify life-
cycle cost reduction opportunities. 
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3 Learnings from the Literature 
This section reviews the pros and cons of potential project delivery models, presents an 
ASD screening assessment criteria, and outlines a framework to guide a decision analysis, and 
provides interview results with selected potential ASD providers. 
3.1 Project Delivery Models 
Traditional competitive bidding for construction contracts may yield the lowest price, but 
it is part of a process whereby there is a trend to pass down risks from design to construction and 
from construction to operations, which has resulted in an adversarial and litigious environment 
that has degraded product quality and contributed to loss of value to the owner [Abi-Karam, 
2006]. A paradigm shift is underway whereby constructors are seeking long-term alliances with 
owners by offering design and build, operate and maintain, and financing services. Furthermore, 
companies with an operating focus and those that provide equipment technology are also seeking 
to provide life-cycle single-point-of-contact services. Engineers are now working for constructors 
and operators. For example, in the water solutions area, EPCOR’s expertise is in operations, yet 
they proactively seek new wastewater projects as the prime contractor from design to operation 
by managing design and construction subcontractors [Cudrac, 2015]. They also use their 
financing ability as a “utility” to access low cost of capital as a competitive advantage. In another 
example, GE, an equipment technology vendor for ABMet® mentioned earlier and a suite of 
membrane technologies, also appears to partner with preferred design and construction companies 
while they provide the long-term operating services (for membranes) for an overall design-build-
operate package. In summary, there is a trend with precedents to single-point-contact outsourcing 
design, construction, and operation of water and wastewater treatment. 
There are many made-in-Canada examples of private-public partnerships (P3) in which 
municipalities have reached favourable arrangements with private-sector companies to execute 
combinations of design, build, operate, finance, and own facilities that provide public services, 
including water and wastewater treatment [PPP Canada 2011, Iacobacci, 2010]. The Crown 
Corporation PPP Canada was created in 2009 to improve the value, timeliness, and accountability 
of public infrastructure though P3 projects [PPP Canada, 2015] and all Federal infrastructure 
projects having an expected lifespan of at least 20 years and a capital cost over $100 M are 
required to be screened for P3 potential [PPP Canada, 2014b]. The driver for many municipalities 
has been the need to expand/upgrade old and poorly-performing water waste water treatment 
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infrastructure to meet increasingly rigorous performance standards [Brubaker, 2011]. Generally, 
municipalities struggle to execute these infrastructure projects for several reasons: 
 Lack of expertise (planning, management, operations, and financial), 
 Lack of financial capacity and project controls (contributing to a track record of cost 
overruns), and  
 Reliance on infrastructure grants is unsustainable. 
Private-public partnerships are viewed as a way to access funding (including pension 
funds), transfer construction scheduling and cost risks (payment at completion is a powerful 
incentive to execute to schedule), and improve cost efficiency (private-sector discipline will filter 
out projects that are not viable). In essence, P3 projects are seen to generate value through 
optimal allocation of risks, increased innovation and efficiency, and by stipulating lifecycle asset 
performance [PPP Canada, 2014b]. 
Public-private partnerships are acknowledged to have originated in the United Kingdom, 
but are now well advanced in Canada across all levels of government and a range of project types, 
including water and wastewater facilities [PPP Canada, 2011]. For example, from the early 1990s 
though 2011 more than 150 P3 projects were completed in Canada, including large and complex 
projects valued at $100 m to over $1 B. The most significant factor with respect to project size is 
transaction costs (financial, legal, technical evaluations) relative to the value generated by the P3 
contract. There are now many precedents to draw from, which has reduced transaction costs such 
that projects as small as $10-20 M are viable P3 candidates. Clearly, a private-public partnership 
is not a possible situation at Teck Coal, but many of the drivers, criteria, and principles should 
also apply to private-private ASD models. Therefore, studying highlights of P3s should offer 
guidance on options for AWTF project delivery at Teck Coal. 
The spectrum of project delivery models are illustrated in Figure 3.1, showing, 
importantly, the increasing shift in project control and associated risk allocation from owner to 
contractor moving from left to right. To note is that PPP Canada consider both Design-Bid-Build 
and Design-Build to be traditional project delivery models. Abbreviated definitions and the 
principal pros and cons of selected models shown in Figure 3.1 are provided in the following 
sections [Shorney-Darby, 2012; Deloitte, 2013; PPP Canada, 2011, 2013, PRT, 2010]. The peer 
reviewer report for the Capital Regional District of Victoria [PRT, 2010] provides pragmatic 
insights from the peer reviewers who have extensive financial, legal, and practical experience 
related to ASD models. 
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Figure 3.1 Project delivery models [PPP Canada, 2014]. 
3.1.1 Design-Bid-Build (DBB) 
Under this traditional model, the owner is generally responsible for specifying the design 
of the project, with design development (detailed design) carried out by the owner or contracted 
to an engineering company. A separate contractor, selected by a separate tendering process based 
on the design documents, is responsible for constructing the project. After construction, the 
project turns over to the owner to operate. 
The advantages of this model are high level owner control throughout design and 
construction and inventory of standard contracts based on experiences from prior projects. The 
main disadvantages are that DBB requires the longest time because the design and construction 
activities are sequential, with duplication of some activities such as piping runs (once be the 
designer and verified by fabricator to prepare the construction estimate), and there is lack of 
emphasis on life-cycle costs and innovation. 
3.1.2 Design-Build (DB) 
Under this model, a single source provider is responsible for both the design and 
construction of a project, thereby seeking the best combined solution. A critical aspect of DB is 
transfer of design liability to the contractor, who is then fully responsible for the project design 
and bears all the risks associated with design errors and omissions. The owner’s responsibility is 
to provide performance objectives and standards rather than detailed design and tender 
documents. After construction, the project turns over to the owner to operate. The DB is 
considered a “traditional” procurement model by P3 Canada [2011, 2014]. The DB model can 
essentially be viewed as the fixed-price version of EPCM, for which there is a range of payment 
options. 
An advantage of DB is single-point contact, thereby eliminating potential adversarial 
relationships between designers and constructors that can occur when sorting out responsibilities 
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for problems as with separate DBB contracts. Another advantage is faster project delivery 
because some aspects of design and construction can happen in parallel since the design 
documentation can be less detailed before commencing construction. This advantage is often 
cited as a key reason for choosing DB project delivery [PRT, 2010]. 
Disadvantages are that risk allocation is limited to design and construction only and, like 
DBB, there is no vested interest by the contractor beyond the limited demonstration period for 
performance/acceptance testing. Performance guarantees under the traditional models DBB, 
EPCM, and DB are often of little value, not easily enforced, and often don not apply after an 
early performance demonstration period anyway. This presents a real possibility for the 
contractor to reduce quality to save costs but potentially create long-term operating issues. 
Problems also arise when the owner is overly prescriptive, running the risk of negating the 
intended transfer of design liability. In other words, it may be difficult for an owner who is 
typically closely involved in developing the final design to relinquish control. 
3.1.3 Construction Manager at Risk (CMAR) 
This model is for the owner seeking many benefits of DB delivery but wanting to retain 
direct control of project definition and design [Shorney-Darby, 2012]. Like DBB, there are 
separate contracts for the design and construction phases. However, under this model the owner’s 
construction manager works with the owner’s engineer in design advancement, ideally from 
about 30%, but up to 60% design completion. At 60% to 90% design completion, the constructor 
bids a guaranteed maximum price. It is similar to the practice of “split contracting” as defined by 
Independent Project Analysis (IPA) whereby the design phase is reimbursable and construction is 
fixed price [Sanborn, 2015]. It differs from and provides advantages over DBB by (a) delegating 
considerable administrative responsibility to the construction manager, (b) permits more 
integration of the design and construction activities, thereby compressing the project schedule, 
and (c) achieves some degree of cost certainty for the owner earlier in the project, but not as 
much as for the DB method. Disadvantages versus DB are owner exposure to change orders and 
responsibility for process performance. The separate contracts require the owner to set QA/QC 
responsibilities for the designer and constructor to ensure complete project coverage. 
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3.1.4 Design-Build-Operate (DBO) and Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM) 
Under this model a single source provider is responsible for the design, construction, and 
operating phases of the project. The DBOM model is thus more seamless than DB. The intent is 
to transfer life cycle cost risk to the contractor; therefore, contracts typically run for 15-20 years. 
Advantages to DBOM include working with one contractor rather than several, greater 
appropriation of risk management, potential for reduced capital and maintenance coats, use of 
advanced technology and equipment, performance guarantees, and shortened delivery schedules 
[Adams, 2003]. When the design-build and operating contracts are separate and sequential, there 
are always challenges and there potential lack of “buy-in” from the operating contractor [Adams, 
2003]. Long-term performance incentives, as a result of being at risk to operating profits, 
motivate the contractor to achieve life-cycle cost efficiencies during procurement, construction, 
and particularly operation. For example, the operating perspectives and insights at the design 
phase can streamline maintenance later on [Cudrak, 2015]. 
The main problem with DBOM is if the contractor simply does not perform and 
escalating remedies do not result in self-correcting performance. Eventually, the owner may have 
to sue the contractor (or parent company), especially if the non-performance relates to 
rehabilitation (major maintenance and sustaining capital investments). In the end, the quality of 
long-term risk transfer boils down to contractor guarantees, which is difficult to appraise at the 
outset when the contract is awarded. The key is to partner with highly-qualified companies with 
solid reputations. However, operating firms often specialize in the water industry and carry out 
due diligence into the technology, design, and constructability of their DB partners [PRT, 2010], 
thereby mitigating the likelihood of performance risks. In fact, dozens of DBOM projects have 
been successfully executed in North America without a change order or performance breach 
[PRT, 2010]. Another shortcoming to some owners, perhaps even more so than for DB since the 
operating phase is included in the contract, is relinquishing the control to which they are 
accustomed. Finally, depending on project size, there may be fewer qualified DBO proponents to 
ensure a competitive procurement process, although those that do compete are felt to be strong 
companies (and partnerships) specializing in providing these services [PRT, 2010]. 
Interestingly, the DBOM model has been in the United States only since IRS Revenue 
Procedure 97-13 allowed such contracts and long-term relationships [Adams, 2003], but the 
model has worked so well that, in 2002, 97% of the contracts of the 2400 public-private 
partnerships were renewed [Adams, 2003], albeit driven largely by lack of funding available to 
the public owners. 
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Payments are made as though there were two contracts. First, payments are at specified 
milestones during design and then monthly during construction [Shorney-Darby, 2012], or just at 
construction completion [PPP Canada, 2013, 2015]. Second, payments during the operations 
phase may be fixed fee plus variable costs (chemicals and energy), or flow through to avoid 
contractor mark-up. Rehabilitation payments may be made on a regular schedule at constant 
amounts or “lumpy” to match when the contractor actually incurs expenses. 
Risks are generally allocated as highlighted in Table 3.1. Contract development is 
relatively complex due to the long operating term, thereby potentially limiting proponents. The 
RFP process has fewer prescriptive design requirements, so proposals tend to generate a wider 
array of design solutions in the proposals that must be thoroughly evaluated for technical risk and 
are easier for mature technologies. A more complete risk listing is provided later in Figure 3.5. 
Table 3.1 Risk allocation in DBOM contracts [Shorney-Darby, 2012]. 
Risk Owner Contractor 
Site acquisition X  
Major permits X  
Financing (shifts to contractor for DBFOM) X  
Technology (AWTF technology section may need to be shared)  X 
Design  X 
Design-specific permits  X 
Construction/acceptance  X 
Schedule  X 
Quality of influent X  
Capacity to treat water  X 
Quality of treated water  X 
Uncontrollable (change in law, force majeure, inflation) X  
3.1.5 Design-Build-Finance (DBF) 
Under this model, the contractor finances the project and the owner makes fixed monthly 
payments to the contractor starting when the project is complete and passes acceptance 
parameters, and then throughout the financing period, typically 15-25 years, or during 
construction upon completion of defined milestones, or at completion of construction. The 
contractor arranges its own financing. Once the DBF asset is constructed and passes acceptance 
testing, it is similar to traditional procurement and has a warranty period of one or two years. 
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Potential advantages to the owner are similar to DB in terms of single point contracting 
and faster project delivery, but there is also cost and time certainty by paying on fixed milestones 
rather than by progress. 
The main potential problem of DBF relative to DBB, DBOM and DBFOM is the least 
consideration for life cycle costs due to the short-term interest of the contractor compounded by a 
procurement process that emphasizes capital costs. This can result in a facility that does not 
operate well and/or is expensive to operate, with little financial recourse for the owner. 
Accordingly, PPP Canada gives it limited consideration, there is no precedent for it in municipal 
wastewater treatment [Shorney-Darby, 2012] and thus it is not recommended for Teck Coal’s 
AWTFs either. 
3.1.6 Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) and Design-Build-Finance-Operate-
Maintain (DBFOM) 
This model combines DBF and DBOM. Under this model, a single source provider is 
responsible for designing, building, partially or fully financing, and then operating and 
maintaining the facility for a period of 20-30 years. There are three basic DBFOM variations: (a) 
build-own-operate-transfer, whereby ownership transfers to the client at the end of the financing 
period (b) build-own-operate, whereby ownership stays with the contractor in perpetuity, and (c) 
build-operate, whereby ownership resides with the owner throughout, but the contractor provides 
some or all of the financing. Option (b) is the design-build-own-operate (DBOO) model at the 
right-most position in Figure 3.1. 
The DBFOM model is not common when the owner has a lower cost of capital unless 
key risks can be transferred to the contractor. Based on the risk transfer aspect it is reportedly 
quite common internationally for municipal wastewater projects, except in the United states, 
[Shorney-Darby, 2012] and is the default procurement option for municipalities under British 
Columbia provincial policy [PRT, 2010]. The DBFOM contractor is commonly a limited liability 
company or corporation, or limited partnership formed exclusively for the project whereby 
facility completion and performance guarantees are provided by the prime contractor with the 
financial resources to support the guarantees [Shorney-Darby, 2012]. When fully contractor 
funded, payments generally do not start until the facility is built, placed into service, and 
performing, and then typically include: (a) a monthly “capacity of availability charge” to offset 
fixed contractor costs plus (b) a variable charge to offset energy and chemical inputs [Shorney-
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Darby, 2012]. In a P3, the provider is selected based mainly on total net present costs [Deloitte, 
2013]. 
The DBFOM model shares the advantages of the DBO and adds cost certainty through 
transfer of equity risks to the contractor, and provides timing certainty of payments by paying on 
milestones rather than on progress. As well, the long-term agreement provides incentive to the 
contractor to perform throughout the full project life cycle. The DBFOM aligns with all of P3 
Canada’s reasons to support and invest in a project [PPP Canada, 2013]. The quality of various 
operating phase securities for DBOM and DBFOM P3 models are provided by PPP Canada 
[2013]. In general, company guarantees are judged to be weak with limited coverage to rectify 
performance, whereas letters of credit for DBOM and the equity investment associated with 
DBFOM are felt to be strong and relatively straightforward to address performance issues. Third-
party investment in DBFOM is considered to provide very strong security and requires the least 
owner involvement to rectify performance issues since the lender will mitigate its losses by 
monitoring the contractor directly. 
Disadvantages to DBFOM are similar to those for DBOM but with increased procedural 
and contractual complexities, requiring increased due diligence of the contracting consortia to 
understand the project requirements and allocation of risks to the contractor. There are several 
other often-underappreciated challenges [PRT, 2010]. First, to address performance issues 
relative to permit requirements the owner has to deal with the project company/partnership rather 
than the actual operating services company because the owner has no privity of contract with the 
operator. Second, convenience termination is difficult because the termination fee has to cover 
operating contract breakage costs, as well as the equity, equity return, and outstanding loan 
balances. This would be a particularly relevant issue if new AWTF or substitute technologies 
become economically favourable and obsolete the incumbent technology leaving stranded capital 
under a DBFOM contract (recall discussion on New Entrants and Substitution in Section 2.1 with 
respect to a Porter’s forces overview shown in Figure 2.3). Without the financial burden in 
DBOM, convenience termination would be easier and stranded assets “just” an owner liability. 
Another challenge with DB, DBOM, and DBFOM is that the concurrent nature of design 
and construction. Permitting agencies are generally accustomed to complete designs to grant 
approval, whereas these models require a series of submittals for various project phases with 
requests for related permits. Finally, and related to privity of contract for both DBOM and 
DBFOM due to their long contract term, the owner cannot attribute statutory risk to the operating 
services consortia and would ultimately be responsible if the consortia defaulted. 
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3.2 ASD Problems and Pitfalls 
Outsourcing does not always provide a beneficial outcome for several reasons, key ones 
being lack of management outsourcing decision-making competencies and processes, including 
how much to outsource, lack of skills to deal with the more strategic and collaborative 
relationships and associated service agreements, and focussing on achieving short-term benefits 
[Harland et al., 2005]. The key is to manage relationships instead of internal functions and 
processes, and to be mindful of social aspects such as employment. A clear understanding of core 
activities is critical to avoid outscoring them. 
Five representative case studies on geographically disperse (global) remunicipalisation 
from private operators included the City of Hamilton that, in 2004, did not renew the contract 
with the private operator [Pigeon at al., 2012]. This case highlighted the problems that can arise 
when there is misalignment of risk and accountabilities. As well, the contract was the outcome of 
“intense political networking” and signed without a tendering process. Eventually, the City of 
Hamilton took back operations and maintenance wastewater treatment services from the private 
contractor, who had been taking advantage of a service agreement that allocated risks poorly. For 
example, (a) small maintenance repairs were deferred until the cumulative scope exceeded the 
threshold at which the City was financially accountable and (b) the contractor pumped faster 
during non-peak hours to save money, but overloaded the piping network, not their responsibility, 
leading to several main breaks that the City had to repair. 
Werkman and Westerling [2000] collated a number of empirical studies that compared 
DBO contracting with traditional procurement models. Contract operations produced lower costs 
when (a) the scope of work was precisely specified in advance, (b) the contractor’s performance 
was evaluated easily, and (c) the contractor could have been replaced after the contract term. 
They found that capturing and maintaining the benefits of market competition on service costs in 
a long-term DBO model may be an elusive objective for several reasons: 
 The process to solicit proposals is more open-ended for DBO than for traditional 
procurement models, with proponents proposing their own capital execution plans, 
resulting in potentially different technical approaches and scopes of work. This 
makes comparing bids difficult. 
 Proponent proposals for allocating risks, which is key to evaluating the long-term 
cost of the DBO contract, may differ, again making bid comparison difficult. 
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 Changing circumstances over a long contract period, particularly in regulation, make 
quantifying risks impossible over the long-term. Since the contractor cannot take on 
risks it cannot quantify, these tend to be borne by the owner as pass-through costs, 
but this runs counter to the premise of risk allocation that is meant to be the 
advantage of DBO contracts in the first place. Terms that protect the contractor also 
negate incentives to control costs. 
 The long-term DBO contractor does not face competition every 3-5 years, and thus 
has less incentive to maintain a high level of performance nor yield on issues that 
must be negotiated. 
 A complex set of rules is necessary to adjust prices to accommodate the magnitude of 
changes likely to occur over several decades that cannot be forecast reliably, which 
thus requires considerable owner legal, technical, and financial expertise. 
 The long-term DBO allows the contractor to “shore up” barriers to entry by 
controlling access to information and developing relationships with client personnel. 
In the end, the long-term superior efficiency of contractors may be “an article of faith”, 
which presumes they are more efficient managers than owners are. Owners need expertise to (a) 
develop a procurement process generating price competition, (b) develop contract terms in which 
the owner has control over key design criteria for capital projects, and (c) assess impact of 
changing circumstances on future costs. Finally, a DBO contract should not be used to fix a 
budget shortfall. Brandes et al. [1997] reviewed five case studies that resulted in the same 
assessment: outsourcing should be a strategic decision including to retain focus on core 
competencies and achieve cost efficiencies, not motivated by financial problems. There must be a 
strong believe the contractor can provide a better product and a more competitive price than was 
done in-house. Finally, the transition to outsourcing should be rapid to avoid discouraging 
proponents with a long-term close relationship. 
Finally, while the United Kingdom may be recognized as the originator of public-private 
partnerships and private finance initiatives (PFIs), a study on road and hospital PFIs concluded 
that is it not clear if the risks have in fact been attributed to the private sector as intended at the 
outset of the agreements. More importantly, the PFIs introduced new risks that were not 
recognized or valued when the value for money (VFM) comparisons were done to support the 
PFI procurement [Edwards et al., 2004]. 
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3.3 ASD Delivery 
The payment profile and potential cost advantages of the P3 model versus traditional 
project execution are illustrated in Figure 3.2. As mentioned earlier, in the PPP Canada models, 
the owner does not pay until the facility is actually delivering according to specifications, 
providing a very strong incentive for the provider to deliver on-time or absorb capital and 
operating cost overruns, and construction delays. The end result is that cumulative payments (the 
combined area of all cost items) with the P3 model can be less than for traditional procurement. 
 
Figure 3.2 Traditional procurement versus P3 model [PPP Canada, 2011]. 
 
The data underlying Figure 3.2 are based statistical analyses (cost overruns, schedule 
delays) of traditional projects and ASD projects by independent financial/accounting consultants 
such as Deloitte and Price Waterhouse Coopers [Sonnenberg, 2015] and, potentially, from 
commissioned studies by project analysts such as Independent Project Analysis . However, the 
assumptions by these consultants to quantify the risks attributed to the contractor, which is key to 
completing VFM comparisons between models, appear to be confidential and certainly not in the 
public domain [Mackenzie, 2013; Sanger, 2013]. As well, few precedents are available for 
industrial projects by DBOM or DBFOM [Sanborn, 2015], again since project cost data details 
for corporations tend not to be in the public domain. 
An illustrative VFM comparison of DBB and DBFOM procurement drawn from 
Deloitte’s P3 preliminary assessment for the City of Regina’s wastewater treatment plant upgrade 
and expansion [Deloitte, 2013] is shown in Figure 3.3. In this case, the project lifecycle cost 
savings was estimated at about $35 M, or 7% of total project costs, before application of the P3 
grant. The savings were associated with allocating risks to the service provider, such as cost 
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overruns and schedule delays as presented in Figure 3.2, for a relatively low risk premium 
charged by the service provider. 
 
Figure 3.3 Illustrative VFM comparisons [re-plotted from Deloitte 2013]. 
A key feature of ASD DBOM and DBFOM models is the 20-30-year term for the 
contracted operation service phase for the following main reasons [Johnson et al., 2002; Adams, 
2003; PPP Canada, 2011, 2014b]: 
 Improved performance and compliance – Service providers make greater up-front 
investments knowing costs can be amortized over a longer time frame. With short-term 
contracts, service providers have limited ability to make capital investments that will 
reduce long-term operating costs. In fact, a short-term focus was found likely not to result 
in the intended benefits to outsourcing [Harland et al., 2005]. As well, providing 
incentive to the service provider to exceed targets is likely to result in premium 
performance. 
 Cost savings – Service providers often bring improved economies of scale to achieve 
better prices for capital equipment, chemicals, and supplies. 
 Accountability – Accountability for performance compliance, cost overruns, and missed 
schedules shifts to the service provider. The more discrete project components that can be 
bundled into the contract, the greater the degree of accountability. 
DBB DBFOM
Owner's costs
Retained risk
Risk premium
Major maintenance
(Rehabilitation)
Operations and Maintenance
Repayment of contractor
financing over operating term
Payments to contractor during
construction
VFM
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 Capital improvements – Service providers can be more capital efficient. The capital 
savings were then used to make system improvements that reduces overall net present 
costs. (The reference did not explain how the capital savings were derived, but 
presumably thorough value engineering, avoiding scope creep, and capital execution 
efficiencies not identified by the municipalities.) 
 Community benefits – From a sustainability perspective, improved water and wastewater 
performance can attract other economic development. Private-sector companies also 
often become involved corporate citizens 
Clearly, a key philosophical issue for Teck is whether project delivery and operation of 
the critically-important AWTFs should be contracted out or performed in-house. A change in 
thinking is needed from traditional DBB and EPCM contracts to ASD models [17 PPP Canada, 
2011]. First, and as mentioned earlier for DB, DBOM, and DBFOM, the owner specifies only 
what is needed, not how the service provider should deliver on these needs. Second, as explained 
above, the owner must anticipate at least 10 and preferably 20-30 year terms for DBOM and 
DBFOM, not a short-term focus to minimize initial capital spending. The owner needs to 
understand what they are looking for; otherwise, comparing bids will be difficult or impossible 
[Adams, 2003]. 
3.4 Assessing Delivery Models 
PPP Canada offers very helpful guidance [PPP Canada, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2014b]. In 
fact, following a multi-step PPP-Canada Business Case Development Guide [PPP Canada, 2014] 
is a prerequisite to qualify for PPP Canada funding and should thus be a good template to assess 
the opportunity for alternative outsourcing models for Teck’s AWTFs. The essential elements of 
the initial stages of the P3 guidelines are illustrated in Figure 3.4. A case study of Deloitte’s 
assessment for the City of Regina, covering Steps 2-3, is presented later in Section 4. 
An essential requirement of Step 1 is obtaining sufficient project definition using 
traditional project delivery to compare ASD methods meaningfully. Such definition requires at 
least a pre-feasibility study, a Class 4 estimate at -20%/+35% resolution based on up to 5% of the 
engineering and which is the stage by which Independent Project Analysis recommends the 
contracting strategy should be known [Sanborn, 2015]. A feasibility study, a Class 3 estimate at -
15%/+20% resolution requiring completion of up to 40% of the engineering may be necessary per 
PPP Canada guidance. 
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At Step 2, Procurement Model Assessment, screening criteria to assess the suitability of a 
project for ASD delivery are outlined in Table 3.2 [PPP Canada 2014b]. Based on the current 
project trajectory for the FRO AWTF, DBB is the baseline delivery approach. Additional criteria 
listed in Table 3.3 from Shorney-Darby [2012] and Deloitte [2013] are assumed for this MBA 
study to be must-have P3 criteria. 
 
Figure 3.4 Essential steps and elements of P3 Canada Business Development Guide [PPP 
Canada, 2014]. 
 
The next requirement at Step 2 is to identify potential proponents and conduct market 
soundings to gauge market capacity and interest in the project. This activity is outside the scope 
of this MBA study, but potential proponents and corresponding reference ASD models were 
outline earlier in Table 2.1. As well, representative companies identified by Teck are overviewed 
in Table 5.2 and discussed later in Section 5.2. Another Step 2 requirement is to develop 
qualitative criteria to rank ASD against traditional project delivery. A representative listing is 
given in Table Table 4.2 as part of the City of Regina case study discussed in Section 4. 
Step 3 focuses on quantifying risks and calculating the VFM. A generic listing of 
representative risks are provided in Figure 3.5. Technology risk, shown as Technology Selection 
at top left, might be the principal risk facing Teck with respect to executing AWTF projects, 
which explains why a fourth pilot program is now underway at FRO to verify several very 
promising options. The challenge is quantifying these risks to make a quantitative VFM 
assessment such as shown in Figure 3.3. For this, the owner will almost certainly have to hire a 
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financial or project analysis consultant because the owner will not have an in-house database on 
ASD to make such quantitative comparisons. Steps 4 should be straightforward with information 
from Steps 2-3 and Steps 5-7 are well understood at Teck. 
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Table 3.2 Screening criteria to assess suitability of a project for P3 delivery [Shorney-Darby, 
2012, PPP Canada, 2011, 2014, 2014b]. 
No Criterion Desirable Conditions 
1 Project Size - Operations 
and Maintenance Scope 
The project is large enough to justify the transaction cost/time to 
develop the contracts. A significant operations component is 
needed so the contractor can produce design and operating 
efficiencies through focussing on life-cycle costs. 
2 Market Capacity and 
Contractor Expertise 
There are sufficient interest, capacity, and proficiency by potential 
proponents to ensure competition. 
3 Market Precedents There are P3 precedents of similar size, technical scope, and 
contract bundling. 
4a Scope Facilities and interfaces with existing infrastructure can be clearly 
defined. 
4b New versus Refurbishment Refurbishment projects not well suited to P3 because latent defects 
can be difficult and expensive for consultant to assess during the 
proposal development and thus to valuate. 
5 Innovation Potential There is potential for the contractor to contribute ideas and best 
practices to improve the project efficiency by integrating design, 
construction, and operation activities. 
6 Legal No barriers exist to executing a contract. Intellectual property (IP) 
can be protected for the owner and the technology providers with 
acceptable non-disclosure agreement (NDA) language and 
timeframes. 
7 Contract Bundling There is opportunity to bundle several contracts together 
representing the project phases, including financing 
8 Project Term A long-term period, 20-30-years, is needed for the contractor to 
recover initial investment (when the contract has an operating 
component). 
9 Project complexity Different asset classes can be bundled together, for example, roads, 
facilities, and water and power conveyance. 
10 Performance Specification - 
Construction 
Construction performance can be measured. 
11 Consistency/Stability There will be stable operations and maintenance performance 
requirements and use of the assets over time. 
12 Performance Specification 
–Operations and 
Maintenance 
Inputs and outputs, reliability, quality, and maintainability are 
available or can easily be defined clearly and objectively based on 
quantifiable parameters. 
13 Refurbishments and Life-
Cycle Costs 
The refurbishment cycle is expected to be stable over the life of the 
contract. Life cycle costs are understood and can be estimated 
accurately. 
14 Revenue There is scope for the contactor to generate additional ancillary 
review. 
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Table 3.3 Must-have criteria for P3 project delivery [Shorney-Darby, 2012 p49]. 
No Criterion Desirable Conditions 
a Site right-or-way, land 
acquisition, and conditions 
Land access can be obtained to site the facility. No known issues 
are evident that could delay or increase the scope of the project, 
such as unstable soil conditions and subterranean conditions. 
b Environmental conditions No known issues are evident that could delay project, such as 
endangered species or archaeological findings. 
c Stakeholder circumstances No significant stakeholder issues exist that would delay/stop the 
project, such as objecting to transferring the project assets and 
operations to the contractor. 
d Degree of risk transfer Some risks can transfer to the contractor. 
e Timeframe There is enough time available for ASD procurement. 
f Technology The technology is defined well enough for ASD procurement. 
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Figure 3.5 Generic project [reproduced partially from Sonnenberg, 2015] and statutory risks. 
 
3.5 Service Provider Perspectives 
Interviews were conducted with executives from four potential service providers to solicit 
perspectives on a range of outsourcing models. Three providers are also technology vendors. The 
following questions were covered and the responses were collated to protect the identity of each 
company. All have operations in at least Canada and the United States, while several are 
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multinational. Twelve key questions were asked across the companies, and the responses are 
listed and discussed below.  
1. From the provider’s perspective are there general themes/consideration that drive clients 
towards outsourcing, and then to a specific outsourcing model (DB, DBO, DBOO, O&M, 
other), such as: 
a. Client can focus on its core business, 
b. Cost, 
c. Single point contact versus separate engineering, construction, operation 
contracts, 
d. Past reputation of provider and associated technology relative to needs, 
e. Lack of client knowledge, experience, capacity, and 
f. Other? 
Responses – Client focus or core business, cost savings, and performance certainties were 
noted as drivers. In one testimony, the service provider developed a process to regenerate a key 
reagent at the customer’s site a product the provider had sold. This differentiated the provider 
from others selling the same product. Eventually, the client outsourced operation of the process 
using the product in addition to the regeneration facility to focus on its core business. Some 
clients have not been able to appropriate capital for utilities and wastewater treatment facilities, 
but were able to execute the projects by bundling financing in the outsourcing contract. The 
service provider advantages in an outsourcing model are singular focus on its scope – no 
distractions – and support from its corporate resources aligned to its operating responsibilities. 
The cost savings accrue by transferring risk, such as construction cost overruns and above 
forecast chemical quantity and utility usage, to the service provider. Unit price risk is usually 
borne by the owner. 
A provider should offer complimentary consulting activity as part of their service (no 
need to spend additional money on consultants) and in-house expertise, say to help assess 
strategies to adjust/modify the facility if inputs change and to support discussions with regulators. 
A Teck interpretation of this complimentary service is to develop relationships so the 
conversations start early on to mitigate problem escalation. 
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2. What are typical strengths and shortcomings with clients as seen by the provider working 
towards the outsourcing models? 
Responses – This really depends on contract language. Client flexibility and openness are 
extremely important, but much time and effort to share information (hurdle rates, turnaround 
scheduling, and operating and maintenance costs) are required at the level needed for the provider 
to be able to develop a possible service scope and complete a value-for-money evaluation. A 
communicative and collaborative culture is needed. In essence, the provider needs to be an 
extension of the client’s operating staff and evaluate upgrades the same way as the client would. 
Clients have to understand that to get value from outsourcing, especially for ASD, they 
need to let go of the details, focus on inputs/outputs and leave the provider to determine how to 
execute the project. “Don’t be too prescriptive!” Weak attempts to outsource are procurement 
(purchasing) driven or when there is mistrust between the parties or lack of knowledge of the 
other party. The more efficient and valuable process is when outsourcing is driven by 
environmental, operations, and technical aspects, and develop a trusting relationship. Finally, 
both parties need participation at a management level with authority to sign the deal from the 
beginning. 
3. Which party tests/evaluates/recommends/decides which technology will be used and to 
what extent is the client typically involved in technology selection?  
Responses – This depends on the relative expertise, and it may take some time for each 
party to understand meaningfully the other’s capabilities, meaning working collaboratively with 
clients. For some clients, one provider selects the process and materials of construction. Teck is 
“definitely leading the way” on pushing technologies for selenium removal. A culture shift at 
Teck would be needed to progress beyond a DBB and DBO – Teck’s involvement in technology 
selection/evaluation would be valued, but after that would need to let go of design and 
construction management. Another response indicated that since the technology is not totally 
verified, it would likely be a shared risk. When the technology is well understood, the service 
provider would take on all the technology risk with a long-term view. 
4. To what extent does owning technologies sway evaluating technologies for client 
applications? 
Responses – One provider that also owns technologies maintained they sell a result, not a 
technology, so they work with what is best, not from where or whom it comes. Client 
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involvement in the process is important and again must develop trust. From a Teck perspective, 
due diligence would be needed to monitor bias that could affect technology selection. 
5. Is Teck’s lead role in technology selection unique or common compared to others? 
Responses – To some providers, Teck knowledge ranks very high and Teck is more 
dedicated to understanding the technologies for facilities than most clients, and is on the leading 
edge of technical capability. The skill set at Teck’s Applied Research and Technology Group 
(ART) allows Teck to be good partners, although sometimes ART does not solicit provider input 
on technology decisions. To another provider, who serves across other industries, Teck’s 
capabilities are comparable to their other industrial clients (about 10% of their business). 
6. What are the provider’s prominent 5-6 criteria to assess an outsourcing opportunity to 
with clients? In other words, what client attributes suggest there is a good opportunity to 
develop a working relationship with to DBOO? 
Responses – A key consideration is to provide service where the provider believes they 
have special expertise, which should translate into reduced operating and maintenance costs. 
However, the cost of capital can be more or less than the client’s. Project execution savings then 
come from good work plans and efficient use of manpower. More importantly, the provider is 
generally willing to invest capital up front to achieve operating cost savings, whereas clients tend 
to minimize initial capital expenditure and not make upgrades later on that can reduce operating 
costs because the upgrades are usually difficult to appropriate, thereby living with inefficiencies. 
The result is often a facility that does not perform as intended or last as long. Quite simply, when 
the provider owns the facility, long-term contracts are the most cost effective since the costs are 
amortized over a longer-term. The client must be open to the idea of a long-term business 
relationship, a minimum of 7-10 years, and negotiating a final solution. One provider seeks a 
financing or ownership position on wastewater treatment, which is aligned with their core 
business. 
Interestingly, the vendor-provider’s equipment design philosophy can be different 
between just selling the equipment to a client versus owning and/or operating it. When selling, 
there is a tendency to provide equipment to pass a performance test, but when operating and/or 
owning, the vendor-provider will provide a more robust design to achieve longer wear and 
performance over the contract life. In short, the provider strives to minimize life-cycle costs, 
whereas owners are generally driven mainly by minimum capital costs.  
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Other considerations from the provider’s viewpoint are (a) the financial viability of the 
potential client, for example, how would a bank view the business opportunity, (b) trust and free 
flow of technical and cost information, (c) clearly defined success criteria, and (d) open access to 
decision makers. 
7. On the operations side, can there be different contracts for operations staff (for example, 
union versus non-union) than for the client’s facilities and if so what are the associated 
challenges? 
Responses – Understand constraints up front. For example, a union site may prohibit the 
provider, if non-union, to complete major maintenance. The key is to avoid “stranded costs”, that 
is a requirement for just a fraction of a person. The provider needs to integrate fully into the 
client’s operating staff. Owning the equipment (DBOO) allows the provider to operate the facility 
the way they deem best, including consideration of union versus not, but following the client’s 
safety programs if they are more robust. The client would control emergency response. Generally, 
the providers can work with a range of staff contracting models. 
8. On performance risk, what is the general approach around accountability/responsibility 
if treatment targets are not met? To what extent can risks be passed to the provider, and 
for what risks is the client ultimately responsible? 
Responses – The provider is incentivized to save net present costs, which might mean 
spending more capital to save operating and maintenance costs. To this end, longer contracts 
provide more opportunity for the provider to recover capital costs. The provider can assume the 
risk of unbudgeted expenses. The client is ultimately accountable to the Ministry, but contracts 
can be written whereby the provider will indemnify the client for fines associated with missing 
mandated permit targets. The client buys a result, and when not met the provider must correct at 
its own cost. Accordingly, the provider will consider carefully all risks, but this requires good 
discussion with client. As well, the provider has to have control of the facility (initial capital and 
upgrades) and one provider has its name on several permits. Teck would own the reputational 
risk, but the regulatory risk can be allocated. A contract can be written to share operating costs 
savings. 
9. What timeframe is typical to execute an outsourcing agreement and does size matter? 
Responses – Size does not really matter. Timeframes are hard to pin down. Every 
situation is different, though 12-36 months is a good starting allowance. Discussions on scope 
(system specification, operating responsibilities, and risk allocation) and unit process design take 
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time; therefore, early collaborative and concurrent discussions on these issues can streamline 
contract execution. Another key is involving counsel from both sides with a penchant for “getting 
a deal done” to work through personal preferences on wording. If both sides are motivated, one 
provider can execute an agreement within 60 days of commitment by client. One provider has 
executed a DBO contract in just six weeks, but a DBFO could be six months. Assessing risks 
takes time. These timeframes do not include the client time to determine first which procurement 
delivery models make sense. 
Two contract principles are important to one service provider. First, the provider never 
takes ownership of the influent, in-process inventory, or product water. Nevertheless, indemnity 
provisions can at least cover fines after making “reasonable commercial efforts”. Second, a 
“change of law” provision is needed to adjust the set points if permit mandates change. On this 
point, over-performance by a wide margin could lead to more stringent regulatory targets that 
could be difficult to reach. The likely idea is to perform just a bit better than well enough. 
The contracting process steps are as follows: 
a. Agree on the client’s needs (technical, operational, financial), 
b. Select the technology (footprint and performance), 
c. Assess the client’s constraints (union contracts, analytical resources, maintenance 
preferences, …), 
d. Understand financing preferences (ultimmate ownership, accounting principles, 
etc), and  
e. Execute contract with “boilerplate” indemnities, warranties 
One provider indicated clients have a penchant for providing their version of the contract, 
whereas it makes much more sense to outline risks first and then work on contract terms. 
10. At what point in a client’s stage gating process would the provider recommend initiating 
outsourcing options evaluation? For example, a key consideration for clients is the 
value-for-money. Yet, to complete this analysis the client, and service provider, need a 
good baseline capital and operating costs estimate for the traditional DBB or DB and 
owner operate model. 
Responses – One provider has experience getting involved a conception, and also taking 
over projects being operated by others. In other words, the earlier the better, but clients need to 
complete some level of estimate to quantify the potential VFM of ASD. One provider indicated 
clients would typically have completed a ± 30% estimate before engaging them for different 
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delivery models and another provider will complete 30% of the engineering so as to quantify the 
risks accurately. 
11. The Teck Coal opportunity would represent a large industrial account. What fraction of 
the provider’s existing DBO, DBFO, operate contracts are with companies like Teck? 
Responses – One provider has clients in size ranging from $5 M to $1 B, with operating 
contracts ranging from a few hundreds of thousands of dollars to tens of millions of dollars per 
year. The sweet spot depends on the client’s needs and approach. Teck’s AWTFs is in this 
provider’s sweet spot for size. One provider acknowledged an Elk Valley Teck Coal account 
would grow their water treatment business by quite a bit, and they have their eyes on this big 
prize. 
12. What are the differences in approach between municipal and industrial, especially on 
risk allocation? 
Responses – Municipal clients can have a very political component and there are some 
different risks than for industrial clients, such as bill collection. In the final analysis, it comes 
down to what is important to the client. 
One provider’s main goal is to invest and believe they have operations expertise, so are 
aligned with the DBFO, DBOO, and DB-own-operate-transfer models. The latter involves 
transfer of ownership to the client at the end of the contracting term. This is the (a) variation of 
the DBFOM model described earlier in Section 3.1.4. 
In summary, these interviews highlighted the following themes: 
 The owner and ASD provider have to be willing to exchange financial information 
and potential project constraints upfront openly in a trusting relationship to be able to 
negotiate a win-win solution, and then integrate with the owner’s team during the 
operating phase, 
 The owner has to be flexible and be prepared to let go of the details and set clear, 
explicit mandates and then monitor outcomes rather than how the mandates are 
achieved, 
 An ASD model works best when the provide has special expertise, then savings arise 
from good work plans and execution, 
 The actual contract can come together quickly (two months) if the lawyers on both 
sides are motivated to make it happen, but generally takes longer, 
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 Alternative service delivery is about life-cycle costing, rather than minimizing 
upfront capital as with traditional delivery models, which may mean greater initial 
capital investment and more robust equipment designs, 
 Long terms are needed to provide the provider time to recover the cost of installed 
capital, and 
 Sufficient engineering study is needed first to quantify the VFM of ASD. This is 
understandable. The contractor needs to complete enough design work to be able to 
justify making a long-term contractual cost commitment, including the operations 
and maintenance phase. 
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4 Case Studies 
This section highlights the methodology and outcomes of an evaluation by Deloitte to 
assess P3 potential for the City or Regina and the financial summary by a peer review team to 
assess P3 potential for the Capital Regional District, in the City of Victoria. 
4.1 City of Regina 
The City of Regina’s process to determine a procurement strategy for upgrading and 
expanding by 20,000 m3/d to 92,000 m3/d the capacity of its wastewater treatment plant provides 
a good case study for Teck AWTFs for several reasons: 
 The project capital costs were comparable to the scoping–level estimates for the FRO 
AWTF at about $180 M, 
 The plant technologies to be upgrade and deployed included several unit operations 
similar to those at WLC and planed for FRO (biological reactor, sludge thickening, 
effluent filtration, anaerobic digesters, and biogas systems), 
 This project was a step out from the City’s traditional DBB procurement approach, 
but they accepted shortcomings of DBB for this large project, 
 Publically-available documents outline the logic and provide the assessment criteria 
lists consistent with the P3 guidelines, albeit these documents do not provide the 
economic assumptions and risk analyses details, which were redacted, and 
 There was a significant change management effort devoted to deal with the 
considerable opposition to the P3 option leading up to a final referendum. 
Deloitte was retained by the City to carry out a delivery model assessment in conjunction 
with AECOM who provided the cost estimates [Deloitte, 2013, 2014]. A key challenge facing the 
city was the project size, which was expected to have overwhelmed the City’s engineering and 
procurement resources using the DBB approach. As well, the City recognized that DBB would 
not have provided connection between the designer, builder, and operator. The preferred 
proponent, EPCOR Saskatchewan Water Partners. (EPCOR as prime contractor), was eventually 
selected based on estimated net present value and the project agreement was signed in July 2014. 
As at the beginning of June 2015, the project was about 40% constructed [Cudrak, 2015]. 
  38 
Selection of the delivery model progressed through three stages of assessment: (1) 
screening for P3 potential, (2) strategic (market sounding, qualitative risk review, and multi-
criteria analysis), and (3) VFM calculations on short-listed P3 options based on capital, operating, 
and risk estimates. Starting in 2012, 22 P3-suitability criteria across 14 categories were carried 
out in a screening workshop to assess P3 potential (Stage 1). These are listed and explained in 
Table 4.1. These criteria were evaluated as “Yes” or “No” relative to P3 potential. 
Having confirmed P3 potential, the City evaluated five procurement models (DBB, 
CMAR, DBOM, DBOM, and DBFOM) and moved to a strategic assessment (Stage 2), starting 
with two rounds of market sounding with potential proponent teams to test the market interest to 
support competitive bidding. Next, a risk workshop was conducted to identify risk areas (such as 
construction delay, construction cost overrun, scope changes, and design errors) and to assess 
qualitatively the probability and impacts on the various execution models. The workshop 
determined that DBFOM presented the lowest overall project risk potential. The City then carried 
out a multi-criteria assessment, with 21 criteria across four categories, to rank the various 
execution strategies. Selected criteria are listed in Table 4.2 that might be instructive for Teck. 
The City recognized that DBOFM and DBOM would only be feasible if the City was willing to 
transfer operational responsibility to the contractor for a 27-y period following construction 
completion (30-year agreement). They also had concerns about the long-term quality of DB-built 
projects. Qualitatively, DBFOM was judged superior to DBOM because the contractor-provided 
financing was felt to provide a strong and liquid security for the long-term performance of the 
contract. The CMAR + DB hybrid (upgrading and new-build scope, respectively) were judged 
better than CMAR because the former was felt most likely to result in capital cost savings and be 
less demanding on City resources. Strategically, the City determined that DBFOM and 
CMAR+DB were favoured, depending on whether the City was willing, or not, to transfer 
responsibility. The case study shows the scores for the project delivery options, but now how 
these were calculated. 
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Table 4.1 City of Regina P3 Screening criteria [Deloitte, 2013]. 
Category Criteria 
Demand Are the long term operation or service needs and performance requirements 
relatively stable and/or predictable? 
Duration and 
Technological Change 
Is the capital asset of an enduring, long-lived nature and is the service life of 
the asset at least 20 years? 
Is there a significant long term maintenance, operation, or service need 
associated with the capital project 
Are the capital asset and service needs sustainable and the risk of 
technological change minimal over the entire service life of the P3 
Innovation 
 
Is there scope for innovation in the design of the solution and/or the provision 
of operation, maintenance, and services, which may lead to cost efficiencies? 
Legal Barriers Is the proposed P3 approach or the provision of the service free of any 
potential legal conflict with legislative or regulatory prohibitions or substantial 
restrictions (that cannot be changed in the short term)? 
Market Are there likely to be at least 3 bidders for the project if it is procured as a P3? 
Are there precedent projects (examples of similar projects) in other 
jurisdictions? 
Has the City received unsolicited proposals for P3-style delivery of the project, 
or similar projects? 
Does the private sector have the expertise and capacity to deliver on the 
performance specification? 
Procurement Is there enough time available for a P3 procurement process? 
Availability Payments, 
Revenue Potential, 
Affordability 
Can payment be tied to measured performance? 
Is there a potential revenue opportunity for the private sector partner, which 
can be also tied to performance? 
Does the City have the financial capacity to undertake the project? 
Project Risk Are there risks associated with traditional procurement that might be better 
managed by a private partner? 
Project Size Is the estimated capital cost significant enough to attract the market? 
Can the project be bundled with one or more other similar projects to achieve 
economies of scale and a larger project size more suitable for P3? 
Specifications Can the capital asset and related services be defined in a performance or output 
specification? 
Land Is the land for the project being provided by the City? 
Project Stage Is the project new build or greenfield? 
Integration Is the project relatively independent of other City projects, infrastructure, or 
control systems? 
Human Resources Does the project, if delivered by a private partner, obviate any current City 
staff positions? 
 
Finally, VFM assessments were calculated (Stage 3) on both DBFOM and CMAR+DB, 
which involved quantifying identified risks. Calculation details are not publically available, but 
summary results are listed in Table 4.3. The total risk-adjusted project cost for DBFOM was 
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estimate at about $479 M over the life of the 30-y contract versus about $514 M for DBB, for a 
savings of $35 M [Deloitte, 2013]. Interestingly, risk-adjusted costs for DBFOM and CMAR+DB 
were similar; however, DBFOM qualified for a PPP Canada Grant estimated at about $44 M, thus 
making this option favourable overall. This option was also Council’s preferred strategy. 
Noteworthy is that savings for the DBFOM model resulted entirely from transfer of risks. In fact, 
the DBFOM project base cost was higher than for the other two options. 
Table 4.2 Multi-assessment criteria for City of Regina P3 assessment [Deloitte, 2013]. 
Category/ 
Weighting Criterion Importance 
Resource 
capacity 
25% 
Minimize demand on existing City procurement resources High 
Minimize design-related demands on City resources High 
Minimize construction-related demands on City resources High 
Solve operation and maintenance resourcing challenges High 
Economic 
40% 
Minimize exposure to construction cost estimation High 
Maximize capital cost certainty (i.e. degree of cost certainty) High 
Maximize operation and maintenance cost certainty over 20+ years Low 
Optimize whole-of-life costs Low 
Maximize flexibility for future expansions/upgrades/other changes Low 
Maximize scope for innovation (i.e. design, construction, operation) Med 
Maximize competitive pressure on capital costs High 
Maximize competitive pressure on O&M costs High 
Alignment 
with 
Management 
Strategy and 
Goals 
25% 
Ensure a robust and easy to operate facility High 
Avoid deferring major maintenance Med 
Transfer design risk (rather than embrace it) Med 
Transfer construction risk (rather than embrace it) Med 
Transfer operation and maintenance risk (rather than embrace it) Med 
Maintain labour support High 
Social 10% Maintain public support High 
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Table 4.3 Preliminary VFM (in millions) from City of Regina’s perspective [Deloitte, 2013]. 
Cost Activity DBB CMAR+DB DBFOM 
Total project base cost (NPC) 452.9 434.1 460.2 
Retained risk 60.9 43.1 12.7 
Risk premium 0.8 1.1 6.4 
Total risk-adjusted project cost 514.5 478.3 479.2 
P3 grant 0 0 44.0 
Total risk-adjusted project cost after grant 514.5 478.3 434.9 
 
A final VFM calculation (Table 4.4) was done after concluding the procurement process 
to include updated and estimates and actual costs and replacing the estimated DBFOM with costs 
of the financial offer from EPCOR Saskatchewan Water Partners, the successful proponent. 
The cost advantage to DBFOM over DBB increased to $95 M ($472 M to $377 M) [Deloitte, 
2014]. Savings were roughly equal between reduced base project costs and reduced costs of 
retained risks (risks not allocated to EPCOR). 
Table 4.4 Final VFM (in millions) from City of Regina’s perspective [Deloitte, 2014]. 
Cost Activity DBB CMAR+DB DBFOM 
Total project base cost (NPC) 409.7 Not 1.358.2 
Retained risk 61.3 Provided 12.5 
Risk premium  0.8  1.6.5 
Total risk-adjusted project cost 471.8  377.2 
P3 grant 0  43.5 
Total risk-adjusted project cost after grant 471.8  333.7 
Note 1: Estimated for DBFOM from Table 4.3 
 
Key milestones are plotted in Figure 4.1. About one year was required to determine the 
delivery model and about 14 months to progress through the procurement process. The contract 
was executed in about five weeks.  
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Figure 4.1 Timeline for City of Regina to evaluate procurement options and award contract. 
 
City council faced considerable opposition to their P3 proposal, and with respect to the 
lack of transparency in Deloitte’s FVM calculation in particular [Mackenzie, 2013, Sanger, 
2013]. Some believed the promotion of P3 delivery by the Harper Federal Government stems 
from a privatization ideology, leading accounting companies to become “ever more inventive in 
their calculations of risk … to justify the DBFOM P3” [Sanger, 2013]. The referendum passed 
with 57% support. 
The following consortiums were selected from the request for qualification phase [Regina 
Water Watch, 2015]. The EPCOR-led consortia were chosen and as at the beginning of June 2015 
the project was about 40% through construction [Cudrak, 2015]. 
EPCOR Saskatchewan Water Partners 
Lockerbie Stanley Inc. – Design and Construction Lead 
Stantec – Design, Construction Team 
EPCOR Water Services Inc. – Project Lead, Operation and Maintenance Lead, Financing 
Team 
Gracorp Capital Advisors – Project Lead, Financing Lead 
Graham Infrastructure LP – Design and Construction Lead 
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Prairie Water Partners 
CH2M Hill Canada Ltd. – Project Lead, Design and Construction Lead, Operation and 
Maintenance Lead 
Maple Reinders Constructors Ltd. – Design and Construction Team 
Alliance Energy Ltd. – Design and Construction Team 
Westridge Construction Ltd. – Design and Construction Team 
GEC Architecture – Design and Construction Team 
Macquarie Capital Group Limited – Project Lead, Financing Lead 
 
Wascana Environmental Partners 
Alberici Constructors, Inc. – Design and Construction Lead 
Burns and Mc Donnell Engineering Co. Inc. – Design and Construction Team 
Black and McDonald Limited – Design and Construction Team 
Allnorth Consultants Limited – Design and Construction Team 
Brookfield Financial Corp. – Project Lead, Financing Lead 
Fiera Axium Infrastructure Canada II LP – Project Lead, Financing Lead 
United Water Environmental Services Canada LP – Operation and Maintenance Lead 
 
4.2 City of Victoria 
A peer review team was solicited by the City of Victoria to review a range or project 
delivery options (Traditional: DBB, CMAR; Alternative: DB, DBOM, and DBFOM) for the 
Capital Regional District (CRD) Core Area Wastewater Management Program [PRT, 2010]. The 
economic comparison is provided in Table 4.5. The Hybrid option is a mixture of traditional and 
alternative for the various geographically separate project components within the regional district. 
Alternative delivery by DBFOM was forecast to save about $76 M on design and construction, 
but life-cycle net present costs were similar for all three strategies. This was attributed to 
conservative assumptions on efficiencies and cost savings on risk transfer for the DBFOM model, 
as well as differences in financing. The peer review team recommend to consider DBOM, which 
had not been estimated, and to carry out sensitivity analyses on a range of less conservative 
assumptions. This collection of projects does not appear to have progressed. 
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Table 4.5 Value for Money (in millions) from CRD’s perspective [PRT, 2010]. 
Cost Activity Traditional Hybrid DBFOM 
Project cost 880.1 826.4 815.6 
Retained risk 61.7 29.8 24.9 
Risk premium  0 20.3 25.3 
Risk-adjusted project cost 941.8 876.6 865.8 
Annual operating and maintenance costs 18.6 18.4 17.6 
Net present cost 923.8 924.6 929.1 
 
In summary, these cases highlight the following points: 
 Estimating the benefits of risk transfer is not straightforward, but is key to 
determining the economic potential ASD, 
 A consultant is likely necessary with a database of comparable projects to quantify 
realistically the transferred risks, 
 Engineering must be sufficiently advanced to refine costs enough to be able to 
resolve between options, which may not be readily apparent at a preliminary 
evaluation, and 
 A sufficient timeframe must be provided to calculate the VFM and, if chosen, to 
solicit independent peer review. 
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5 Teck Perspectives and ASD Assessment for AWTFs 
The following discussion assesses whether the ASD model may be appropriate for Teck’s 
AWTFs using the PPP Canada screening criteria (Table 3.2), and criteria weightings and scoring 
guidelines [PPP Canada, 2014b]. Again, while the PPP Canada P3 screening guideline was 
developed to guide Federal organization assess P3 potential across a range of infrastructure 
projects, the concepts are generally the same for industrial companies. As well, the criteria 
weightings, and scoring guidelines have been developed from considerable effort over several 
years and should thus provide a progressed starting point for assessing ASD for Teck’s AWTFs. 
Development of scores for each criterion is provided in subsequent subsections. 
The criteria scores were collated to total an overall rating for ASD potential per the P3 
Canada guidelines in Table 5.1. Scores at or below 50 points are not considered candidates for 
ASD execution, while scores above or equal to 75 have strong ASD potential and should be 
considered for further evaluation. This analysis determined the AWTF projects have mix of 
favourable and unfavourable attributes for ASD. The high score is just reaches the minimum 
threshold value where ASD should be considered. The low score results from criteria (5 and 7) 
where Teck may have trouble “letting go” of input specifications. The issues are: 
 Technology selection, for which the low discharge levels of nitrate and selenium 
from such high influent values is unprecedented, 
 Current uncertainty in influent definition (Criterion 12) and potentially required 
effluent end-of-pipe targets, 
 Timing and the timeframe to negotiate an ASD contract given the accelerated pace to 
deploy AWTFs, 
 Teck’s project execution culture might not be able to adjust timely to the different 
mind-set necessary for ASD procurement, and 
 Quantifying risks that could be attributed to a service provider needed to support 
calculating the VFM. 
On technology, a must-have criterion from Table 4.2, risks of non-performance will 
likely need to be shared with an ASD provider [Sonnenberg, 2015]. Teck has already solicited 
participation of the prefeasibility study contractor in the current pilot plant program. An operating 
service provider will also need to participate if Teck intends to contract out the operating phase or 
use full ASD. The technology selection for FRO is planned in October 2015. 
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Table 5.1 Criteria scoring summary and overall rating for ASD potential. 
  Weighted Scores 
No Criteria Description High Low Max 
1 Project Size - Operations and Maintenance Scope 50 50 50 
2 Market Capacity and Contractor Expertise 30 30 50 
3 Market Precedents 15 15 25 
4 Scope and New versus Refurbishment 25 25 25 
5 Innovation Potential 30 15 50 
6 Legal 15 15 25 
7 Contract Bundling 50 15 50 
8 Project Term 25 25 25 
9 Project complexity 50 50 50 
10 Performance Specification for Asset Construction 12 12 25 
11 Consistency/Stability 17 17 25 
12 Performance Specification for Operations 10 10 25 
13 Refurbishments and Life-Cycle Costs 40 40 50 
14 Revenue 5 5 25 
 Total Score 374 324 500 
 Total Score Normalized to a Maximum of 100 75 65 100 
 
On influent water quality definition, a consultant will have a report ready in time to 
commence the feasibility study for FRO in November 2015 to support detailed process 
engineering design. However, there is some regulatory risk for end-of-pipe targets as discussed in 
Section 5.11 with respect to Criterion 11. 
On timing, and as mentioned in Section 3.4, sufficient project definition for traditional 
project delivery is needed to compare meaningfully ASD methods, but not advancing past the 
point at which decisions are cast in stone. This balance point is judged to be at least at pre-
feasibility but not past feasibility. Therefore, the timing will be good in October 2015 to calculate 
the ASD VFM with reference to the FRO AWTF, if even to serve as a benchmark for the next 
AWTFs. 
The issue of the timeframe to execute an agreement was discussed with several service 
providers in Section 3.5 and is another must-have criterion from Table 3.3. Actual timeframes 
range from a few to many months. The “soft” gate (no time delay) planned between the pre-
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feasibility and feasibility studies for the FRO AWTF likely does not provide time to assess ASD 
for this project, particularly given the timeframe required in the City of Regina case study, the 
anticipated timeframe for management of change to an ASD model within Teck, and the 
timeframe to analyse/quantify risks. Change management alone would be a big effort given 
Teck’s existing project execution culture. Nevertheless, an analysis would provide definitive 
clarity for the next AWTF planned for EVO. 
On culture, and recognizing that treating such high combined loading of nitrate and 
selenium is charting new technical ground, specifying outcomes do not align with Teck 
management’s “desire to understand the problem at the most detailed level by having [in-house 
experts], people [management] trust, dig into the detail and be confident in a proposed solution or 
path forward.” However, while Teck’s strong in-house technical expertise is acknowledged in 
feedback from potential ASD proponents in Section 3.5 “Service Provider Perspectives” and by 
others, Teck does not have a monopoly on technical talent. Collaboration with others generally 
provides fresh perspectives and knowledge, and stimulates in-house thinking. Therefore, Teck’s 
in-house experts can continue to dig into the details and provide valuable input to an ASD 
proponent for a joint path forward, already seen as a likely path forward by a potential proponent 
[Sonnenberg, 2015]. In short, collaboration improves outcomes. 
Again, on culture, Teck’s management sees that “having a long-term contractual 
boundary between the owner who has accountability for performance (environment) and the 
people doing the work, the situation exists where it is less efficient to effect needed change and 
improvements resulting in additional time and cost to yield results. This could also mean 
additional regulatory risk due to the time it would take to effect changes to improve facility 
performance.” On the contrary, the ASD model incents the service provider to perform according 
to contracted specifications; otherwise the owner may withhold payment. The key would be 
executing the contract with provisions for changes in regulation. 
On quantifying risks, Teck would need to solicit a financial/accounting consultant or 
project analyst, which could take up to several months if data is not available. 
The following subsections describe, for each criterion, what is being measured, tables the 
desired conditions and scoring guidelines, and concludes with the criterion score. This analysis is 
a representative. Further criteria development and analyses beyond this MBA report and with a 
broader stakeholder group may be appropriate. 
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5.1 Criterion 1 – Project Size 
Criterion 1 measures if the project is large enough to offset the higher transaction costs 
for ASD than traditional project delivery. The extra effort to prepare the value-for-money 
estimate against the baseline project delivery cost was not specifically mentioned by P3 Canada 
for this criterion, but this calculation also requires effort. The capital costs for the next several 
AWTFs are forecast to be over $150 M and undiscounted 25-year operating costs are forecast to 
be equal to or up to 40% greater than capital costs. (The 25-year period represents the mid-point 
target duration for P3 contracts and the assumption for this project is that the scoring guidelines 
refer to undiscounted cash flow.) On these bases, Criterion 1 scores at five (5) and receives 50 
weighted points (5 x 10). 
Wt Desirable Conditions 
10 
The project is large enough to justify the transaction cost/time to develop the contracts. A 
significant operations component is needed so the contractor can produce design and operating 
efficiencies through focussing on life-cycle costs. 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
$100M or more 
Capital costs are 
less than $100M, 
but operating & 
maintenance costs 
will be 2-3 times 
larger than capital 
costs 
$50M or more, 
but less than 
$100M 
Capital costs are 
less than $50M, 
but operating & 
maintenance costs 
will be 3-4 times 
larger than capital 
costs 
Less than $50M 
5.2 Criterion 2 – Market Capacity 
Criterion 2 ensures there are enough potential proponents to ensure (a) a competitive 
bidding environment and (b) that the proponents have enough capacity to perform all of their 
project obligations and manage the allocated risks as committed in the contract. A Teck Coal 
AWTF account would be a substantial undertaking for any proponent. Hiring and training new 
staff would be required for all, but also for Teck. 
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Wt Desirable Conditions 
10 
There are sufficient potential proponents with interest, capacity, and proficiency to ensure 
competition. 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
There are more 
than 5 private 
sector firms 
capable of 
forming teams 
with the expertise 
to design, 
construct and 
maintain/operate 
this type of asset 
There are more 
than 5 private 
sector firms 
capable of design, 
construct and 
maintain phases. 
Operations 
capability is not 
yet determined. 
There are 3 to 5 
private sector 
firms capable of 
forming teams 
with the expertise 
to design, 
construct and 
maintain/operate 
this type of asset 
There are 3-5 
private sector 
firms capable of 
design, construct 
and maintain 
phases. 
Operations 
capability is not 
yet determined. 
There are fewer 
than 3 private 
sector firms 
capable of 
forming teams 
with the expertise 
to design, 
construct and 
maintain/operate 
this type of asset 
 
Seven potential proponents are listed and assessed in Table 5.2. There may be others, for 
example BioteQ. Teck has no first-hand experience with the commercial operating capability of 
any of these vendors, although has some pilot plant operating experience with GE. As well, some 
of these companies may not have experience executing projects the size of Teck’s AWTFs. 
Market capacity was noted to limit potential proponent by peer reviewers assessing delivery 
methods for the $940 M wastewater management plan for the CRD in Victoria British Columbia 
[PRT, 2010]. The identified potential consortia were led by CH2M Hill, EPCOR, Veolia, United 
(now Suez), and American Water, but, apart from EPCOR, little to no experience with such large 
DBFO projects in North America. Individually, the Teck AWTFs are much smaller, theoretically 
qualifying more options. On these bases, Criterion 2 scores at three (3) and receives 30 weighted 
points (3 x 10). 
Table 5.2 Potential proponents for Teck Coal ASD and quick assessments. 
Proponent Quick Assessment 
Corix Privately held corporation, principally by the British Columbia Investment Management 
Corporation. Representative experience indicates 70 years of design, fabrication, and 
operations capability, including wastewater treatment, for small- to medium-size 
municipal clients throughout North America. Has implemented composting for residuals 
management. 
Strength appears to be developing, designing, and fabricating custom packaged and 
modular wastewater treatment plants using a range of unit operations consistent with 
several in Teck’s AWTFs [Corix, 2015]. 
Envirogen Developed, designed, built, and operating the Henderson water treatment plant for NERT 
using most of the technologies planned for Teck Coal’s AWTFs. 
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Strength is FBR bioreactor and selected other technologies; partners with others to 
design-build. 
EPCOR Privately held corporation with City of Edmonton as sole shareholder. Started as 
Edmonton’s power and water company 120 years ago [EPCOR, 2015]. 
Has several municipal wastewater treatment contracts in western Canada and in Arizona 
and New Mexico with a range of delivery models using some of the technologies in 
Teck’s AWTFs; operating Anglo’s demonstration wastewater treatment plant at Peace 
River Coal for nitrate and selenium removal; in discussion with Teck for WLC operating 
contract. 
Awarded to lead City of Regina wastewater treatment DBFOM contract for about $600 M 
life of 30-y agreement [City of Regina, 2014b]; now about 40% construction completion. 
Strength and strategic focus is operating wastewater treatment plants, preferably through 
investment potential (DBOO, DBFO); partners with others to design-build. 
Suez-
Degrémont 
Suez-
United 
Water 
Offer a range of delivery models (DB, O+M, BO + transfer) globally for municipal and 
industrial clients. 
Strength is a business focus on water treatment, including aerobic membrane bioreactors, 
but applications using biological technologies anaerobically appears lacking. [Degrémont, 
2015]  
GE Has over 150 BOO contracts (six wastewater) internationally using a range of their own 
technologies including membranes, evaporation-crystallization, multi-media filtration, 
(one membrane bioreactor application). 
Working towards an operating service agreement using ABMet® bioreactor for 
confidential client. 
Very engaged with Teck’s ART group and carrying out in-kind technology development 
work to progress ABMet®. 
Strength is ABMet® biofilter, membrane technologies, ultrafiltration, and evaporation-
crystallisation; partners with others to design-build. 
Newterra Representative experience indicates 150 years of design, fabrication, and operation 
capability for wastewater treatment globally. 
Strength appears to be testing, designing, and fabricating custom packaged and modular 
wastewater treatment plants, including for remote applications [Newterra, 2015]. 
Veolia Operate 38 wastewater and 6 groundwater treatment plants for a range of industrial clients 
[Oliphant, 2015]. Examples include: 
 10-y DBOM contract with Consol for mine wastewater treatment in West Virginia. 
 Operations and maintenance contract for three small Alpha Natural Resources 
wastewater plants for nitrate + selenium treating using Veolia’s own bioreactor and 
solid-liquid separation technologies. 
Has 20-30-y BOM contracts for municipal wastewater treatment in China, Germany, 
others. 
Strength is MBBR biofilter, dissolved air flotation, ballasted sand clarification; partners 
with others to design-build. 
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American 
Water 
Headquartered in Voorhees, NJ, are the largest publically-traded water and wastewater 
utility company in the United States [American Water, 2015]. 
Have operations in which they own, as well as operations in which they provide 
operations and maintenance services. 
5.3 Criterion 3 – Market Precedents 
Criterion 3 measures the precedents for P3s for similar assets to indicate viability for the 
project being evaluated. While there have been numerous P3 projects delivered in Canada of 
similar or greater capital cost [Conference Board of Canada, 2010], none are similar in technical 
scope to what is required for the AWTFs at Teck. (Scope for this project is taken with reference 
to a technical basis.) The Conference Board of Canada omitted some municipal examples by 
EPCOR [2015] that include unit operations similar to those in the AWTFs, although the project 
size is likely less than an AWTF for Teck based on project data provide by Deloitte for several 
municipal facilities [2013]. As well, in 2014 the City of Regina awarded a DBFO contract to 
upgrade its wastewater treatment plant to a consortia led by EPCOR [City of Regina, 2014]. The 
cost of construction to treat the design 156,000 m3/d was agreed at $181 M, which was $43.5 M 
less than budgeted [City of Regina, 2014b]. The long-term cost for the 30-y agreement was 
reported at $611 M, $248 M under budget. This is certainly of similar or greater size to what is 
required for the AWTFs at Teck but is a municipal application, so of somewhat different 
technical scope. There are ASD models of similar or somewhat smaller size of very similar 
technical scope (CH2M DBO for Patriot Coal at Apogee and for The US Department of Energy at 
Hanford; Veolia DBO for Consol; Worley Parsons/EPCOR DBO demonstration plant at the 
Trend Mine for Anglo American; USFilter DBO at Henderson2). On these bases, Criterion 3 
scores at three (3) and receives 15 weighted points (3 x 5). This scope assume size is less 
important that technical scope. 
                                                     
2 USFilter was reconfigured shortly after construction completion, with Veolia picking up the operating 
capability and who operated the facility until several years ago when the contract was renewed with 
Envirogen. 
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Weight Desirable Conditions 
5 There are P3 precedents of similar size, technical scope, and contract bundling. 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
Projects of similar 
size and scope 
have been 
procured as P3s in 
Canada 
Smaller projects 
of similar scope 
or, projects of 
similar size but 
smaller scope 
have been 
procured as P3s in 
Canada. 
Projects of similar 
size and scope 
have been 
procured as P3s 
internationally 
Smaller projects 
of similar scope 
or, projects of 
similar size but 
smaller scope 
have been 
procured as P3s 
internationally. 
Projects of similar 
size and scope 
have not been 
previously 
procured as P3s. 
5.4 Criterion 4 – New or Refurbishment 
Criterion 4 considers if the project has opportunities to transfer risk relative to existing 
infrastructure where distinguishing between the defects in pre-existing and new construction 
would be difficult. Since all AWTFs subsequent to WLC will be new with no existing 
infrastructure and no existing site development, the scope of facilities will be straightforward to 
define and Criterion 4 scores at five (5) and receives 25 weighted points (5 x 5). 
Weight Desirable Conditions 
5 
Facilities and interfaces with existing infrastructure can be clearly defined. 
Refurbishment projects not well suited to P3 because latent defects can be difficult and 
expensive for consultant to assess during the proposal development and thus to valuate. 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
Asset is new 
construction on an 
undeveloped site. 
Asset is new 
construction on an 
already developed 
site 
Project involves at 
least 50% new 
construction and 
also significant 
renovations to the 
existing asset 
Project involves 
expansion and/or 
refurbishment of 
an existing asset. 
Asset 
procurement is 
mainly for 
refurbishment, 
modernization, 
minor renovation, 
or involves 
integration of new 
facilities with 
existing facilities 
5.5 Criterion 5 – Innovation Potential 
Criterion 5 tests the extent to which the owner (the response indicators are written from 
the perspective of a public entity – municipal, provincial, or federal government) is prepared to 
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let the proponent innovate to achieve specified outcomes and not to prescribe inputs, or how the 
outcomes will be delivered. The ASD model is not well aligned with Teck’s project development 
and execution culture and is inconsistent with Teck’s project execution stage gating process. 
Due to the small owner’s team at Teck Coal to assess and select the technology, 
coordinate the design and construction activities, build the process management systems, and hire 
timely the operating/maintenance staff, the AWTF at WLC was executed essentially as DB+O 
project contracted to CH2M. The originally anticipated short-term operating contract of several 
years was intended to provide Teck time to build its own operating and maintenance team, with a 
plan to operate the next AWTF at FRO from day one. 
The literature on P3 project delivery does not appear to address the issue of technology 
readiness, other than to comment that, for public owners, private service providers will likely 
incorporate new technologies as appropriate to achieve life-cycle cost efficiencies. For municipal 
ASD models, the contractor normally assumes all the technology risk [Sonnenberg, 2015]. The 
situation at Teck Coal may be more complicated in that potential technologies to achieve the 
target selenium and nitrate performance without inadvertently producing toxic water [Hume, 
2014; Black, 2015] remain to be verified, but is expected to become better understood over the 
next few years. Teck has commissioned and/or led pilot programs in 2013 and 2014, and is 
leading a pilot program again in 2015. Since this program will conclude the technology selection 
by Teck and the prefeasibility engineering contractor before a potential ASD service provider has 
been solicited to provide a proposal, the technology risks in an ASD model would likely be 
shared with the service provider and not fully allocated as for a municipal client for a process 
using more proven technology [Sonnenberg, 2015]. As well, the AWTF projects must be 
operating within timelines proposed by Teck’s EVWQP, and accepted and prescribed by the 
Ministry of Environment. 
Once the technology is selected, there should be opportunities to use output specifications 
for the design, construction, and operation. Indeed, in early 2014 Teck considered what amounted 
to a DBO proposal from a consortium through one vendor [GE] for the FRO AWTF, and 
currently is requesting process design recommendations from the engineering contractor during 
the pre-feasibility study for FRO. In other words, there is some openness towards output-
specification project execution, although it remains to be seen to extent to which this will evolve 
given the aggressive schedule for FRO. Overall, the highest plausible score for Criterion 5 is 
three (3) and receives 30 weighted points (3 x 10), otherwise a score between one (1) and two (2) 
seems appropriate, or 1.5 for 15 weighted points (1.5 x 10). 
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Weight Desirable Conditions 
10 
There is potential for the contractor to contribute ideas and best practices to improve the 
project efficiency by integrating design, construction, and operation activities. 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
The owner is 
prepared to use 
output 
specifications for 
all phases of the 
project. 
There are very few 
areas where the 
owner feels it must 
be prescriptive/use 
input-based 
specifications. 
The project 
requirements will 
be a mix of input-
based and output-
based 
requirements 
The project’s 
design and 
construction will 
be based on input 
specifications. 
The owner 
believes it must 
make specific 
input 
requirements for 
the majority of 
the asset. 
5.6 Criterion 6 – Legal Considerations 
Criterion 6 is intended by PPP Canada to assess security level requirements for Federal 
projects. Since security as defined in the P3 screening guideline does not apply to Teck’s 
AWTFs, this project recasts security as an issue of intellectual property across multiple vendors, 
and particularly if one technology vendor is awarded a DBO contract in which the process 
includes one or more competing technologies. A new set of response indicators is proposed. This 
criterion has not been tested, but a score of three (3) seems probable based on conversation with 
some technology vendors also offering ASD and receives 15 weighted points (3 x 5). 
Weight Desirable Conditions 
5 
No barriers exist to executing a contract. Intellectual property (IP) can be protected for the 
owner and the technology providers with acceptable non-disclosure agreement (NDA) 
language and timeframes. 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
No IP issues are 
expected across 
the suite of vendor 
technologies 
based on 
appropriate NDA 
terms. 
 
Firewalls are not 
required, but each 
technology vendor 
performs major 
maintenance 
within their 
equipment to 
protect IP. 
 
Firewalls between 
technology 
vendors are 
required and a 
technology-
agnostic prime 
DBO contractor is 
required 
5.7 Criterion 7 – Contract Bundling 
Criterion 7 measures the potential to bundle the different project phases (design, build, 
finance, own, operate) into a single contract. In some respects, the criterion overlaps with 
  55 
Criterion 5 in that the more comfortable the owner is toward output specification, the more likely 
that owner would be to bundle project phases together. A single contract is meant to motivate the 
proponent to minimize combined capital and operations/maintenance costs for the life of the 
asset. Interestingly, the PPP Canada guideline substitutes financing for ownership. 
Scoring this criterion is difficult. Teck’s current trajectory for the FRO AWTF does not 
include an operating component, equivalent to a score of one (1). However, there is probably no 
technical reason (e.g. legal, permitting) why several project phases could not be bundled together, 
equivalent to a score of five (5). Teck is seeking an operations and maintenance contract for WLC 
and a DBO is probably a reasonable extension for FRO since Teck had executed a DB+O initially 
for WLC, albeit not based on ASD analysis. The financing option may also be attractive so that 
Teck can allocate capital to core mining activities, not just at Teck Coal, but across the company, 
although a shift in culture would be required that might take longer than timeframe constraint for 
the FRO AWTF. Since the response indicators are framed around what is possible rather than 
what is the owner’s tendency or comfort level, the first-pass score for this report is five (5) to 
produce 50 weighted points (5 x 10), otherwise the score is probably 1.5, for 15 weighted points. 
A sensitivity analysis may be advised but is outside the scope of this MBA project. 
Weight Desirable Conditions 
10 
There is opportunity to bundle several contracts together representing the project phases, 
including financing 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
All P3 project 
phases design-
build-finance-
maintain-operate 
could be 
integrated into one 
contract 
Design-build-
finance-
maintenance and 
some operations 
could be 
integrated into one 
contract 
Design-build-
finance and some 
maintenance 
could be 
integrated into one 
contract 
At least design, 
build, finance will 
be integrated into 
one contract 
Only two phases 
of the project can 
be integrated into 
one contract 
5.8 Criterion 8 – Asset Life and Project Term 
Criterion 8 simply records the lifespan of the asset. The P3 contracts tend to correspond 
to the useful asset life, and so asset life and contract term are synonymous. Long life provides 
cost certainty for the owner, and a revenue stream sufficient to recover initial capital costs. With 
suitable sustaining capital provisions the AWTFs are forecast to operate for at least 25 years, 
resulting in score of five (5) to produce 25 weighted points (5 x 5). 
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Weight Desirable Conditions 
5 
A long-term period, 20-30-years, is needed for the contractor to recover initial investment 
(when the contract has an operating component). 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
Asset life is 
greater than 25 
years 
Asset life is 20-24 
years 
Asset life is 15-19 
years 
Asset life is 10-14 
years 
Asset life is less 
than 10 years 
5.9 Criterion 9 – Project Complexity 
Criterion 9 accounts for the number of asset classes, the idea being the greater the 
diversity in asset classes the greater the potential for ASD. As an example, the FRO AWTF has 
an access road, building, process equipment, power and natural gas transmission, piping 
conveyances, and a residuals storage area (landfill). The score for Criterion 9 is clearly five (5) 
and receives 50 weighted points (5 x 10). 
Weight Desirable Conditions 
10 
Different asset classes can be bundled together, for example, roads, facilities, and water and 
power conveyance. 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
Combines three or 
more classes of 
asset i.e. building 
+ road + 
outbuildings 
Project by its 
nature is very 
complex i.e. 
bridge and 
involving two or 
more assets, or 
significant 
technology 
Combines two 
classes of asset of 
medium 
complexity i.e. 
rail line and 
station 
Combines two 
assets of low 
complexity i.e. 
road and toll 
booths, or one 
asset of higher 
complexity, water 
treatment plant 
Single asset class 
5.10 Criterion 10 – Performance Specifications for Construction 
Criterion 10 looks at the status of or the effort required to prepare “output specifications” 
for the construction phase, in other words to define what the facility has to do rather than to 
specify how the facility needs to be construction to achieve target requirements. As an example 
for the FRO AWTF, input specifications would prescribe the number of parallel treatment trains, 
which equipment must be inside a building and specifications on the building (e.g. equipment 
spacing and access). An output specification would provide the seasonal variation in flowrate and 
nitrate/selenium loading, and seasonal snow-load and temperature along with the required 
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effluent quality. The trade-off studies performed by the engineering contractor during the current 
pre-feasibility study for FRO are effectively responding to output specifications; except that Teck 
has outlined which trade-off studies were to be carried out and has a voice in assessing and 
selecting each option. The score for Criterion 10 is felt to be between two (2) and three (3), or 
12.5 (round down to 12) weighted points (2.5 x 5). 
Weight Desirable Conditions 
5 Construction output performance can be measured. 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
Output 
specifications for 
same type of 
asset(s) exist and 
are available. 
Output 
specifications for 
similar asset are 
available. 
Existing 
conventional 
specifications can 
be converted into 
output or 
performance 
specifications 
easily. 
Existing 
conventional 
specifications can 
be converted into 
output or 
performance 
specifications 
with some 
difficulty. 
New technical 
outputs and 
specifications will 
have to be 
developed. 
5.11 Criterion 11 – Operations and Maintenance Stability 
Criterion 11 assesses if the long-term operational and equipment maintenance needs are 
relatively stable and predictable to be forecast at the outset of the agreement. The criterion 
balances asset life, contract duration, and potential influences of external drivers, such as 
regulatory changes. A guidance example in the P3 screening guideline recommends scoring five 
(5) if the operating permit for the facility is renewed every 10 years and the operating contract is 
renewed every 10 years or less. 
The permit guiding performance requirements for the AWTFs is long-term, albeit the 
terms may be amended by the Ministry in accordance with Section 16 of the Environmental 
Management Act. There is also a lingering threat that Federal Metal Mining Effluent Regulations 
(MMER) under the Fisheries Act might be imposed over Provincial authority. The MMER would 
mandate known end-of-pipe criteria as opposed to in-stream criteria that provide for dilution 
zones, which are written into the current permit for Teck Coal by the Provincial Ministry of 
Environment. Mining coal does not currently fall within the MMER definition of “mine” 
[Fisheries Act, 2002]; therefore, Teck’s coal mines are currently exempt. As well, performance 
enhancements might be required pending findings from the adaptive management plan that must 
be carried out as prescribed in this permit. 
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Technology uncertainty may be implicit in this criterion, in which case forecasting 
operating costs and maintenance requirements will be very difficult when there are no or few 
technical performance precedents on similar influent water. Equipment maintenance requirements 
are more certain and for the most part should be able to be inferred from other operations and 
piloting experience at Teck Coal on actual influent water. Overall, the score is judged to be 
between three (3) and four (4), or 3.5 and receives 17.5 (round down to 17) weighted points 
(3.5 x 5). 
Weight Desirable Conditions 
5 
There will be stable operations and maintenance performance requirements and use of the 
assets over time. 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
Operations and 
maintenance 
requirements are 
predictable and 
stable 
Operation and 
maintenance 
requirements are 
predictable, but 
have some 
instability based 
on known factors 
Operations 
requirements are 
unstable, but 
maintenance 
requirements are 
predictable 
Operations 
requirements are 
not stable and 
maintenance 
requirements are 
somewhat 
predictable. 
Operations and 
maintenance 
requirements 
cannot be 
predicted and are 
unstable 
throughout the 
project life. 
5.12 Criterion 12 – Performance Specifications Operations and 
Maintenance 
Criterion 12 assesses the availability of operating and maintenance performance 
specifications of the asset, whereas Criterion 11 accounted for the stability of these specifications 
over time. For the AWTFs at Teck Coal, there are elements of specifications spanning the full 
scoring range. For example, specifications for the treated water are well defined by the permit, 
scoring five (5), but maintenance indicators are probably less well developed but can likely be 
inferred from non-Teck facilities using similar equipment (unit operations), thus scoring a three 
(3). Seasonal concentrations variations of key species in influent water at FRO are currently being 
modelled as a cross-check on existing available data. These data are needed to verify definition of 
the output specifications for seasonal ramp up/down, which represents a principal long-term 
facility design consideration. Currently, the score on this specification would be one (1) to two 
(2), though results are expected to be available at the next study phase (feasibility). Overall, the 
score is judged felt to be two (3) and receives 10 weighted points (2 x 5). 
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Weight Desirable Conditions 
5 
Inputs and outputs, reliability, quality, and maintainability are available or can easily be 
defined clearly and objectively based on quantifiable parameters. In other words, performance 
can be easily described and measured. 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
Performance 
outputs and 
indicators for 
operations and 
maintenance 
activities are 
available 
Performance 
outputs and 
indicators exist, 
but are not readily 
available 
Performance 
outputs and 
indicators for 
comparable assets 
exist and are 
available 
Performance 
outputs and 
indicators for 
comparable assets 
exist and are not 
readily available 
Performance 
outputs and 
indicators will 
have to be 
developed 
5.13 Criterion 13 – Refurbishments (Sustaining Capital) 
Criterion 13 assesses the availability and reliability of information to profile operating 
and maintenance costs, including sustaining capital (refurbishment) investments over the contract 
period. A guidance example in the P3 screening guideline recommends scoring five (5) if major 
design, construction, energy, and replacement costs can be documented “fairly easily”, whereas 
scoring three (3) is recommended if major design, construction, and energy costs can be 
documented, but replacement costs cannot. Overall, the score is judged to be four (4) and receives 
40 weighted points (4 x 10). 
Weight Desirable Conditions 
10 
The refurbishment cycle is expected to be stable over the life of the contract. Life cycle costs 
are understood and can be estimated accurately. 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
Project life-cycle 
costs are well 
understood and 
accurate estimates 
can be developed 
by the owner 
Project life-cycle 
costs are 
understood but 
estimates, while 
accurate are 
incomplete to 
some extent 
Project life-cycle 
costs are well 
understood, and 
can somewhat be 
accurately 
estimated by the 
owner 
There is limited 
understanding of 
life-cycle costs 
but costs cannot 
be accurately 
estimated by the 
owner 
Project life-cycle 
costs are not well 
understood and 
cannot be 
estimated by the 
owner 
5.14 Criterion 14 – Ancillary Revenue Potential 
Criterion 14 measures the opportunity for the service provider to generate additional 
ancillary review. Notwithstanding the small possibility to capture some biomass for composting, 
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generating additional revenues is unlikely at this stage of project development, thus scoring one 
(1), for a weighted score of five (5) (1 x 5). 
Weight Desirable Conditions 
5 There is scope for the contactor to generate additional ancillary review. 
Scoring Guidelines 
5 4 3 2 1 
Project will 
generate revenues 
and the private 
sector may be 
willing to assume 
associated 
revenue risk 
Project could 
generate revenues 
and private sector 
may be willing to 
share revenue risk 
Project could 
generate revenue 
and the private 
sector’s 
willingness to 
accept revenue 
risk is unknown 
Project could 
generate minimal 
revenue and the 
private sector is 
unlikely to accept 
any revenue risk 
It is unlikely that 
the project will 
generate any 
revenues 
5.15 Summary 
Given that Teck solicited in 2014 a scoping-study-level DBO proposal for the FRO 
AWTF and is currently negotiating a contract for outsourcing operation and maintenance of the 
WLC facility, there appears to be some interest in ASD procurement, which should be explored 
further using FRO pre-feasibility study data to provide clarity for subsequent AWTFs. The 
following self-assessment might help determine Teck’s aptitude (capacity, capability, potential) 
for ASD [Shorney-Darby, 2012 p56]: 
 Are there legal capabilities/restrictions/limitations to executing an ASD contract, 
 What are the objectives and motivation, 
 Is there a learning culture to try new options, and if not, what are the obstacles, 
 Is there capacity for change (change management as noted earlier), such as from 
managing details with a linear reactive approach by departments and groups with strictly 
defined roles, responsibilities, and administrative processes to a flexible structure and 
culture for macro-managing collaboration, and from thinking in terms of low-bid to best 
value 
 Whether having designer of record not working for Teck is acceptable, 
 Can the innovation and performance promises from a contractor can be trusted, 
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 What is the appetite for risk sharing, and accepting that some risk can’t be off-loaded (for 
example, environmental permits, unforeseen hazards and conditions, changes in 
law/regulation), and  
 Is a third party is needed to facilitate the ASD assessment process? 
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6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
A spectrum of potential of alternative project delivery models and associated benefits and 
shortcomings were described that might be advantageous for Teck’s Active Water Treatment 
Facilities by achieving capital and operating cost reductions, and allowing Teck to focus on core 
mining activities. There are several industrial precedents with similar technical scope or size for 
alternative service delivery as well as a host of P3 wastewater treatment projects in Canada 
valued at $100 M to over $1 B. The Crown Corporation PPP Canada has developed a framework 
for evaluating whether project attributes are suitable for P3 delivery for public agencies and 
municipalities that should also provide guidance for ASD potential in the industrial sector. 
The P3 screening criteria assessed that Teck’s AWTFs are suitable candidates for ASD, 
such as DBOM or DBFOM, and should be considered further. However, issues associated with 
ownership of technology selection, quantifying risks assigned to the ASD provider, timing and 
timeframes to quantify cost benefits to ASD, and a shift from Teck’s traditional project delivery 
culture likely cannot be achieved timely for the facility at Fording River Operations, which is 
now in the engineering study phase. 
A comparative quantitative analysis of DBOM and DBFOM against the current project 
execution trajectory for the FRO AWTF is recommended to provide definitive clarity on 
economic potential for the next facility planned at Elkview Operations. Two methods are 
recommended for the quantitative analysis. First, following the pre-feasibility study now 
underway for FRO a financial or independent project analyst consultant would be consulted to 
quantify risk that could be assigned to an ASD provider. Risks would be identified in a workshop, 
ideally with a potential proponent. The consultant should have databases comparing different 
delivery models, for which Teck likely does not, providing a statistical basis to evaluate the risks. 
This option would produce the quickest VFM, but the resolution would likely be poor. The other 
method would start with a market sounding to ensure a level of competition. This would be 
carried out in parallel with the engineering studies now underway. Following feasibility, a 
potential ASD proponent would be solicited to prepare a formal ASD proposal (DBOM and/or 
DBFOM) that could be compared to the feasibility study. This option would produce the best 
resolution, but would take longer and cost more because it essentially involves a shadow 
feasibility study by the potential ASD proponent. 
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